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THE RISE AND FALL OF PRIVATE SECTOR 
UNIONISM: WHAT NEXT FOR THE NLRA? 
JEFFREY M. HIRSCH* AND BARRY T. HIRSCH**
ABSTRACT
 In this Article, we ask whether the National Labor Relations Act, 
enacted over seventy years ago, can remain relevant in a competitive 
economy where nonunion employer discretion is the dominant form of 
workplace governance. The best opportunity for the NLRA’s continued 
relevance is the modification of its language and interpretation to en-
hance worker voice and participation in the nonunion private sector 
without imposing undue costs on employers. Examples of such re-
forms include narrowing the NLRA’s company union prohibition, im-
plementing a conditional deregulation system that relies on consent 
by an independent employee association, changing the labor law de-
fault to some form of a nonunion work group, expanding state and lo-
cal authority over labor relations, and encouraging NLRA protection 
for employee use of employer-owned Internet services. These legal in-
novations have the potential to be welfare-enhancing, as compared to 
outcomes likely to evolve under the current legal framework. Although 
the political likelihood of such changes is currently low, steps in this 
direction could result in an increased relevance for the NLRA in the 
modern economy.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 19351 provided the 
legal framework that ushered in union organizing, collective bargain-
ing, and a sharp rise in private sector unionism in the United States 
during the early and mid-twentieth century. Since that time, the role 
and relevance of the NLRA has narrowed as private sector union 
density has eroded.2 In today’s competitive environment, the domi-
nant form of workplace governance lacks the presence of a union; it is 
a governance structure under which management has unilateral, al-
beit constrained, discretion with respect to most aspects of the work-
place. This dominance is so complete that reforms in the NLRA can-
not restore traditional unionism to its previous level. Designed for a 
different era and type of workplace, the NLRA’s 1930s vision of bar-
gaining relationships has limited relevance today. One result of this 
transformation is an unmet desire of many nonunion workers for op-
portunities to express individual and collective voice in cooperation 
with their employers, albeit in a form different from what exists in 
most traditional union establishments. 
 This Article explores changes in labor law and public policy that 
might satisfy this unmet desire by promoting welfare-enhancing 
worker voice, participation, and cooperation in the United States la-
bor market, in particular for nonunion, private sector workers.3 Un-
derlying this assessment of possible regulatory change is the reality 
that in today’s competitive environment, the dominant form of em-
ployee governance is one in which management has unilateral discre-
tion with respect to most aspects of the workplace environment, con-
strained by societal norms, employment regulations, and the need for 
employers to attract and retain capable employees. This reality is re-
flected in the declining fortunes of traditional private sector union-
ism—a decline that does not look to be reversed in today’s increas-
ingly competitive economic environment.  
 Most labor reforms, including some discussed here, were origi-
nally proposed with the intent of either encouraging or discouraging 
traditional unionism. Our concern, however, is not with the promo-
tion of an arguably outdated model of collective representation. 
Rather, our analysis recognizes that traditional unionism will remain 
 1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). 
 2. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1527, 1527-28 (2002); infra Part II.A. 
 3. Major themes in this Article were previously outlined in a brief proceedings paper. 
Barry T. Hirsch & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The NLRA After Seventy Years: What Next?, 58 PROC.
LAB. & EMP. REL. ASS’N ANN. MEETING 133 (2006). 
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a small part of the economy’s private sector and focuses on reforms 
that, given this fact, are welfare-enhancing for society as a whole. 
The focus of this Article’s proposals, therefore, is to facilitate welfare-
enhancing employee voice and participation in an economy where few 
private sector employees will be represented by traditional unions. 
 We use the term “welfare-enhancing” to indicate that the societal 
benefits from a change exceed its costs, with benefits and costs inter-
preted broadly to include nonmonetary as well as monetary effects. 
Of course, reliable estimation of the benefits and costs associated 
with labor regulations is exceedingly difficult.4 Therefore, although 
we cannot state with certainty that our proposals would be success-
ful, they represent promising opportunities to enhance overall wel-
fare by expanding worker voice and cooperation without imposing 
undue costs on—and perhaps providing benefits to—employers. 
 The need for welfare-enhancing labor reform is well-illustrated by 
the contrast between the NLRA’s policies and antiquated view of the 
workplace and the workplace as it currently exists. The original ver-
sion of the NLRA was enacted in 1935 and is popularly known as the 
Wagner Act. A key goal of the Wagner Act was to promote national 
commerce, which had faced major disruptions due to labor unrest,5
by “protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own 
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of 
their employment.”6 The Wagner Act’s endorsement of collective ac-
tion7 was tempered by the Taft-Hartley Act’s amendments to the 
NLRA in 1947. Although not mutually exclusive with the purposes of 
the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley amendments emphasized, among 
other things, the goal of protecting employee free choice—specifically 
the choice not to seek collective representation.8 The resulting NLRA, 
 4. See John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, The Economic Effects of Employment 
Regulation: What Are the Limits?, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 125, 134-38 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997) (outlining “the methodological 
framework by which employment regulations are assessed”). 
 5. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive 
World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 602-05 (2007).
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
 7. See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, 
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1449 (1993) (stating that “the pri-
mary objective of the Wagner Act was to achieve workers’ ‘substantive freedom’ ” 
through “the facilitation of collective action in the labor market in order to enhance 
workers’ bargaining power”).
 8. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 229 (1990); Estlund, supra note 2, at 1534. The unmistakable concern of 
proponents of the amendments was to assist the ability of employees to choose not to have 
collective representation, in large part to combat what proponents viewed as abuses by un-
ions. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (stating in preamble that “[e]xperience has further demonstrated 
that certain practices by some labor organizations . . . have the intent or the necessary ef-
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therefore, has a strong aim to promote and protect the ability of em-
ployees to freely choose whether or not to engage in collective action 
or representation. This policy goal is not limited to choices about tra-
ditional unionism, however. Collective action may take many forms, 
and employees’ freedom to choose unconventional means to exercise 
their collective rights is firmly within the protection of the NLRA.9
 The NLRA’s statutory language is vague enough to protect, at 
least theoretically, ever-changing forms of collective action—even 
forms found in a modern workplace that is vastly different from what 
existed in 1935. Many manufacturing jobs have been replaced by po-
sitions that stress service or intellectual skills.10 The strict hierarchy 
that once existed in most workplaces has eroded as many businesses 
seek flexibility, information sharing, and more decentralized man-
agement.11 Although the broad scope of the NLRA’s language is gen-
erally capable of taking these changes into account, the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), the agency that enforces the 
NLRA, has been surprisingly reluctant to support these changes. 
Some of the NLRA’s provisions are beyond the Board’s control, how-
ever, and several have become obsolete or even detrimental in the 
contemporary economy.12 Thus, both flexible enforcement and statu-
tory changes in the NLRA are warranted. 
 Part II of this Article examines the rise and fall of private sector 
unionism in the U.S. and addresses the reasons that managerial dis-
cretion, rather than union-negotiated agreements, has emerged as 
the dominant form of workplace governance. Part III explores private 
sector workers’ desire for more voice and cooperation in the work-
place and describes ways in which that desire may be satisfied. Fi-
nally, Part IV evaluates several labor regulatory changes that may be 
welfare-enhancing, providing greater opportunities for employee 
voice and participation while being economically sustainable in a 
competitive economic environment. 
fect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . through strikes and other forms of industrial 
unrest or through concerted activities”). 
 9. See infra note 209. 
 10. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 5, 125 (2004); Estlund, supra note 2, at 1536 
(citing Richard Freeman, Is Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?,
in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 143, 164 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos 
eds., 1992)). 
 11. See DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING THE WORKPLACE: HOW BUSINESS AND 
EMPLOYEES CAN BOTH WIN 2-8 (1995) (providing brief history and usage data on employee-
involvement plans); Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium: 
Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1651, 1652-53, 1663-66 (1999). 
 12. One example, as discussed in detail below, is the NLRA’s ban on company unions. 
The broad definition of “labor organization,” working in tandem with that ban, reveals a 
need for modification of the statute. See infra Part IV.A. 
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II.   IS THE NLRA RELEVANT IN TODAY’S WORKPLACE?
A.   Private Sector Unionism in Decline 
 It is undisputed that unionism in the private sector has long been 
in decline. Private sector “union density”13 was about one-in-three 
workers in the early 1950s, falling to nearly one-in-five workers by 
the end of the 1970s.14 Although the number of private sector work-
ers climbed from 66.1 million to 107.8 million workers between 1977 
and 2006, union membership declined from 14.34 million to 7.98 mil-
lion.15 This translates into a union membership density decrease 
from 21.7% (or 23.3% covered by a collective-bargaining agreement) 
in 1977 to only 7.4% (8.1% covered) in 2006.16 Particularly sharp de-
clines occurred in sectors highly organized in the past. Between 1977 
and 2006, membership density fell from 35.5% (37.6% covered) to 
11.7% (12.5% covered) in manufacturing and from 35.9% (37.6% 
covered) to 13.0% (13.6% covered) in construction.17 It is difficult 
to identify large industries in which private sector union density 
has not diminished. 
 Nor has private sector unionization ended its decline. Union den-
sity is affected by “flows” in and out of union and nonunion employ-
ment stocks. In any given year, large numbers of union and nonunion 
jobs are lost and large numbers of mostly nonunion jobs are created. 
For membership to remain constant, union organizing of existing and 
new nonunion workplaces, plus employment gains in already-
unionized workplaces, must equal the number of union jobs lost. For 
 13. Union density is defined here as the percentage of wage and salary workers who 
are members of a union or, where indicated, covered by a union-negotiated collective-
bargaining agreement. 
 14. Union density among private sector workers, based on a compilation of figures re-
ported by labor unions to the federal government, is estimated to have peaked at 35.7% in 
1953 and fallen to 22.0% in 1979. See LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION 
SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, FINANCES, STRUCTURE, DIRECTORY A-1, A-2 (1985). 
 15. See Union Membership and Coverage Database, http://www.unionstats.com (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Union Membership] (compiling data since 1973 from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), the monthly household survey conducted jointly by the 
Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), as described in Barry T. 
Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Cur-
rent Population Survey: Note, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 349 (2003)). The CPS adopted 
the currently used union status questions in 1977, hence the choice of years in the text. 
 16. See id.
 17. See id. In contrast to the private sector, public sector union density rose sharply 
during the 1960s and 1970s and has held relatively steady since the early 1980s. Public 
sector membership density rose from 32.8% (40.1% covered) to 36.2% (40.1% covered) be-
tween 1977 and 2006. Id. Whereas 25.8% of all union members were public sector workers 
in 1977 (and 28.4% public among all covered workers), 48.0% of union members were gov-
ernment workers in 2006 (48.5% among covered). Id. Among 7.38 million union members 
employed in the public sector in 2006, 62% worked in local government, 25% in state gov-
ernment, and 13% in federal government. Id. The federal government figure of 13% con-
sists of union densities of 6.9% for postal employees and 6.1% for nonpostal employees. Id.
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density to remain constant in an economy with a growing labor force, 
the flow into membership must exceed the number of union jobs lost. 
Organizing since the early 1980s has fallen well short of the condi-
tions to hold density constant; thus, the steady-state private sector 
density is likely to be below its current level of 7.4%.18
 The reasons for declining unionism are many and well known. 
Important, but hardly sufficient, are structural changes that have 
reallocated jobs toward industries, occupations, and locations that 
are typically less unionized. A significant factor leading to these 
changes has been technological advances that reduce the need for la-
bor in production jobs and in occupations where job tasks are routi-
nized and programmable (for example, newspaper typesetters in an 
earlier era and travel agents today).19 This rapid productivity growth 
has been particularly evident in manufacturing, where increasing 
output has been accompanied by lower employment.20 Moreover, the 
NLRA organizing process has proven costly and difficult for unions, 
due in no small part to often fierce management opposition.21 Such 
resistance reflects, more fundamentally, an increasingly competitive 
domestic and international economy22 coupled with union wage pre-
miums that have shown surprisingly modest declines.23
 18. See Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the 
Private Sector, 1973-1998, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 28, 52-54 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2002).
 19. See David H. Autor et al., The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An 
Empirical Exploration, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1279, 1279-86 (2003). 
 20. Manufacturing employment declined from approximately 20 million workers in 
1977 to 15.6 million workers in 2006; because of the growth in overall employment during 
that time period, manufacturing employment declined from 30.3% of the private sector 
workforce in 1977 to 14.5% in 2006. See Union Membership, supra note 15; see also STONE,
supra note 10, at 197 (arguing that decline in manufacturing unionism has allowed em-
ployers to restructure work practices in ways that make organizing more difficult, such as 
increased use of technology). 
 21. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 116 (1999) (describ-
ing survey results showing that a majority of managers would oppose union organizing). 
Similarly, Cynthia Estlund has argued that the NLRA’s isolation from any significant re-
visions or other forms of innovation—which she describes as its “ossification”—has 
contributed to the NLRA’s ineffectuality and the decline of unionism. See Estlund, su-
pra note 2, at 1530-32; see also STONE, supra note 10, at 125 (stating that the NLRB’s 
organizing rules, such as bargaining unit determinations, are often incompatible with 
the modern workplace). 
 22. Indeed, Michael Wachter sees a single, overarching reason for union decline, argu-
ing that the NLRA did not incorporate the corporatist outlook of the 1933 National Indus-
trial Recovery Act (NIRA), which was overturned by the Supreme Court in its 1935 deci-
sion in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and that over 
time, the competitive U.S. economy made unionism a niche workplace institution in the 
private sector. See Wachter, supra note 5, at 584-85, 588-90, 598, 606-07, 613. 
 23. Wage premiums refer to differences between union wages and the wages of non-
union workers with similar skills in similar jobs; wage premiums in the U.S. are larger 
than in most other developed countries. See David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, 
Changes over Time in Union Relative Wage Effects in the UK and the US Revisited, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS 197, 207-21 (John T. Addison & Claus 
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 Sentiment for unions by workers, the public, and employers is the 
ultimate constraint in this highly competitive world, limiting not only 
the ability to organize but also adoption of union-friendly public pol-
icy and workplace norms.24 Sentiment for unions may have been 
dampened by government mandates and regulations that affect all 
workplaces; such legislation may act more as a substitute than a 
complement for collective bargaining.25 Changes in the interpretation 
and enforcement of the NLRA since the 1980s—when Republican 
administrations led to an NLRB less supportive of union organiz-
ing—have not enhanced organizing but can explain little of the de-
cline. Private-sector union density decreased throughout the Clinton 
years and its more labor-friendly NLRB.26
 Absent a sharp and unlikely shift by workers and voters from in-
dividualistic to collectivist attitudes27 or a more broad shift in U.S. 
economic policy from a competitive to a corporatist orientation,28 a 
Schnabel eds., 2003) (summarizing international evidence and concluding that there has 
been only a weak downward trend in the U.S. union wage premium); see also Barry T. 
Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EARNINGS DATA BOOK:
COMPILATIONS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 19-26, tbls.2a-c (2007) (providing 
time-consistent regression estimates of union wage premiums for the years 1973-2006). 
 24. See, e.g., Darryl Fears, Union Tries to Unite Blacks, Latinos: Workers at Meat-
packing Plant Must First Overcome Distrust, WASH. POST, July 24, 2006, at A4 (noting re-
sistance of some workers to unionization, including one employee’s comment that “ ‘[a] un-
ion speaks on your behalf . . . . I can speak for myself’ ”). Distrust of traditional unions is 
common among professional and technical workers who often identify with management. 
See Richard W. Hurd & John Bunge, Unionization of Professional and Technical Workers: 
The Labor Market and Institutional Transformation, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 179, 186-90 (Richard B. Freeman et al. 
eds., 2005) (describing their survey of professional and technical workers, which revealed 
desire for greater voice and participation in decision-making, but aversion to the type 
of adversarial relationship often seen in unionized workplaces). Worker sentiment to-
ward organizing is also less favorable in geographic areas where unionization has 
been low in the past. See Thomas J. Holmes, Geographic Spillover of Unionism 1 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12025, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12025 (showing that unionism is “contagious,” spilling 
out of long-ago unionized coal mines and steel mills into newly established supermarkets 
and hospitals). 
 25. See George R. Neumann & Ellen R. Rissman, Where Have All the Union Members 
Gone?, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 175, 175-77 (1984) (estimating frequently espoused, but rarely 
tested, thesis that governmental protections for workers have led to lower union density 
and finding time-series and cross-section evidence consistent with thesis). 
 26. See Union Membership, supra note 15. Private sector union density decreased 
from 11.4% in 1993 to 9% in 2001. Id.
 27. Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Proc-
esses, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 265, 278-87 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 1998) (arguing that in-
creases in union density have occurred in spurts following shifts in worker and public atti-
udes t ward collective action). t o
28. Corporatist governance emphasizes cooperation among groups and cooperation 
between the state and certain powerful groups, such as national unions. See Wachter, su-
pra note 5, at 589-90. In the labor context, “[c]orporatism views free competition as a de-
structive force that has to be both controlled and channeled through institutions that prac-
tice fair—but not free—competition under the watchful, mediating power of the govern-
1140 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1133 
                                                                                                                   
resurgence in traditional private sector unionism is unlikely. Thus, 
employees’ demand for greater workplace voice and cooperation29 will 
not be satisfied by NLRA-style collective bargaining. This leads to 
questions about the NLRA’s continued relevance and whether other 
forms of employee representation and participation will develop. 
B.   Managerial Discretion or Contractual Governance: Which Works 
Best?
 How relevant is the NLRA for workers in the current U.S. labor 
market? Apart from its role in governing the union organizational 
and electoral process, the NLRA’s role in nonunion workplaces, which 
cover over 90% of private sector employment, is modest.30 Even for 
firms that could face union organizing campaigns, the NLRA’s rele-
vance has waned, as today’s workplaces no longer match the work 
environment envisioned by the NLRA’s architects.  
 Implicit in the NLRA is a hierarchical view of management, in 
which workplaces have top-down control moving from managers to 
workers who have minimal discretion or decision-making authority. 
This characterization may have been defensible during the NLRA’s 
formative years, but not today. Traditional union governance regular-
izes and codifies worker tasks within a top-down command structure. 
In contrast, modern workplaces typically require interaction and two-
way communications between workers and supervisors, accompanied 
by the use of bottom-up worker and managerial discretion that takes 
advantage of “site-specific information.”31 In contemporary work-
places, job hierarchies are often not clear-cut and worker decision-
making is essential at most levels.32
 In addition, the current dominant governance structure in the 
private sector is not traditional unionization but human resources 
ment.” Id. at 583. Corporatist policymaking, therefore, seeks “fair union wages” and “re-
sponds to institutional actors such as unions and corporations rather than to individuals.” 
Id. at 584.
 29. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. 
 30. The NLRA does apply to nonunion workforces in numerous circumstances, al-
though employees’ knowledge of the statute’s relevance is uncertain. Most obviously, the 
NLRA governs the organizational and electoral process before a union becomes the bar-
gaining representative. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2000). The NLRA also protects a wide variety 
of concerted activity, even where there is no union on the scene (for example, safety com-
plaints and pushes for higher wages). See id. § 158(a)(1); infra notes 209-15 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, as discussed in detail below, section 8(a)(2) regulates nonunion em-
ployers’ ability to create or support groups that involve discussions with employees over 
terms and conditions of employment. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2); infra Part IV.A. 
 31. Site-specific information refers to information targeted to a particular work loca-
tion, product, process, or time. 
 32. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibi-
tion: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 
135-39 (1994); supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.  
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management (HRM) systems in which personnel outcomes are de-
termined by some combination of employer norms, governmental 
regulation, and the incentives and constraints produced by market 
forces. The principal market constraints derive from competition in 
capital and labor markets. For the firm to survive over the long run, 
it must earn a competitive return on capital, preventing an employer 
from paying its workers a wage in excess—or, at least, well in ex-
cess—of the value they generate for the firm. In order to attract and 
retain capable employees, however, workers must expect to receive 
compensation similar to or in excess of what they could receive in al-
ternative employment opportunities. Subject to these economic con-
straints—as well as governmental limits on actions involving dis-
crimination, minimum pay, hours of work, safety, and the like33—
nonunion employers are free to dictate wages and workplace govern-
ance methods. If a wage and governance regime is costly relative to 
the value of output, the employer will suffer losses. If wages are too 
low or the work environment too harsh, the firm cannot attract and 
retain sufficient numbers of workers to operate and survive. For en-
terprises operating between these upper and lower bounds, nonunion 
employer fiat has proven to be a more dominant governance struc-
ture than collective bargaining contracts. 
 Michael Wachter identifies several factors in labor-contracting re-
lationships that are critical for all firms, union and nonunion, and 
that help to explain the current dominance of nonunion governance 
structures.34 Wachter argues that the predominance of nonunion 
firms is primarily the result of low transaction costs coupled with the 
ability of nonunion firms to deal effectively with match-specific in-
vestments, asymmetric information, and risk bearing.35 Although un-
ionized firms can handle these latter three factors through formal 
contracting, nonunion companies manage these factors without the 
use of explicit contracts, sometimes more and sometimes less effec-
 33. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000); Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as am-
ended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000) and in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 42 & 49 U.S.C.); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
 34. See Michael L. Wachter, Theories of the Employment Relationship: Choosing Be-
tween Norms and Contracts, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WORK AND THE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 163, 167-71, 175 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 2004). Alan Hyde 
has identified similar market failures—such as inelasticity of supply, collective action 
problems, low trust and opportunism, and information asymmetry—that he argues provide 
justification for labor regulation. See Alan Hyde, What Is Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES 
AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAWS: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK (Guy 
Davidov & Brian Langille eds., forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 16), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=896381. 
 35. See Wachter,  supra note 34, at 167.   
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tively than if they were unionized.36 More significant is the disadvan-
tage that union companies face due to high transaction costs.37
 Match-specific investments refer to the time and money expended 
to create higher workplace output that is not valued by or transfer-
able to other firms.38 As workers acquire these firm-specific skills, in-
cluding the ability to deal with their co-workers, supervisors, suppli-
ers, and customers, they become more valuable to their current em-
ployer than to alternative employers.39 A problem associated with 
match-specific investments is the possibility of a hold-up problem: 
once a party makes such investments, the other party can behave op-
portunistically and capture ex post “quasi-rents.”40 One solution is for 
workers and firms to jointly invest in firm-specific skills that create 
self-enforcing agreements that give both parties an interest in con-
tinuing the relationship rather than losing their investment.41 Op-
portunistic behavior by nonunion employers is also constrained by 
concern for their reputation among potential workers.42
 Asymmetric information involves differences in the ability of the 
parties to monitor certain aspects of the job or firm, creating a risk 
that the advantaged party will behave opportunistically.43 For exam-
ple, firms possess information on product demand superior to that of 
workers, thereby providing firms the opportunity to misstate market 
conditions to gain an advantage in workplace negotiations.44 A result 
of the product-demand asymmetry has been the widespread norm 
under which firms rarely adjust wages downward but are relatively 
 36. See id. at 167-70.   
 37. See id. at 170.   
 38. See id. at 167.   
 39. Id.
 40. Id. at 168. This difference between a worker’s value to the firm and value to the 
outside labor market is a “quasi-rent” that a party may be able to capture by, for example, 
threatening to end the work relationship unless they receive a larger share of profits. Id. 
As Wachter notes, match-specific investments generally benefit both employers and em-
ployees; thus, the parties, and society, would be better off if the parties could make match-
specific investments without the risk of the other party attempting to capture any rents 
that result after the initial investments are made. Id.
 41. Id.
 42. See id. at 176. Not so easily solved is the hold-up problem faced by union firms 
with respect to firm-specific capital investments. Once fixed capital is in place, unions can 
capture—or “tax”—some share of the normal returns to investment. Knowing this, union-
ized firms will invest less, requiring a higher “before-tax” return. See Paul A. Grout, In-
vestment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach, 52 
ECONOMETRICA 449 (1984) (providing theory); see also Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions 
Do for Economic Performance?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 415, 434-36 (2004) (evaluating empirical 
literature for U.S., which generally finds lower investment in physical capital and research 
and development among union firms). 
 43. See Wachter, supra note 34, at 168.
 44. Id. at 168-69.
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free to adjust employment levels.45 This self-enforcing mechanism 
helps to diminish opportunistic use of the information asymmetry by 
eliminating the incentive to understate the true level of demand in 
order to justify a decrease in wages.46 Employers lack incentive to 
misstate demand with regard to employment levels because they do 
not want to cut employment if demand is strong.47 In unionized 
workplaces, a similar but more formal arrangement exists, where 
most collective-bargaining agreements allow employment level, but 
not wage, adjustments absent negotiation. Unions may grant em-
ployer requests for wage concessions, but generally only if financial 
records are disclosed to union representatives.48
 Risk bearing is another major problem in the employment rela-
tionship. Because most workers have incomes tied to their jobs, they 
are in a poor position to bear company-specific earnings risk that 
could result in fewer hours, lower wages and benefits, or job loss.49
Investors, in contrast, can readily diversify investments and bear 
such risk. This difference in the ability to tolerate risk may cause 
problems, as workers’ compensation and wealth are tied to factors 
out of their control. More efficient risk bearing would insulate work-
ers’ compensation from variances in firm revenue and profit.50 Con-
sequently, both union and nonunion workplaces tend to have rela-
tively “fixed wage rates.”51 In union companies, such rates are usu-
ally required under a collective bargaining agreement, and in nonun-
ion companies, there is a largely self-enforcing implicit contract or 
norm of fixed wages, with employer reputation playing a key en-
forcement role. 
 The principal advantage of nonunion pay and governance deter-
mination over union agreements is not from the above factors, but 
 45. Id.; see also TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION
(1999) (providing comprehensive theoretical and empirical treatment of why wages are 
rigid downward). 
 46. Wachter, supra note 34, at 169. 
 47. Id.
 48. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956) (holding that an em-
ployer that claims an inability to provide wage increases must disclose financial informa-
tion to support claim). Later decisions have limited employers’ disclosure obligation to in-
stances where it explicitly states that it cannot afford a union demand. See Graphic 
Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 49. See Wachter, supra note 34, at 169; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the 
Collective Negotiation and Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response 
to Henry Hansmann and Other “Survivalists,” 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 977-78 (1998). 
 50. Wachter, supra note 34, at 169. 
 51. The term “fixed wage rates” refers here to time-based pay (for example, an hourly 
wage or annual salary) that does not vary with respect to temporary fluctuation in firm 
revenues and costs.  
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rather from transaction costs.52 Because new information is con-
stantly coming to a firm and its workers, it is prohibitively costly to 
have explicit contract terms for every possible contingency. Although 
many collective bargaining agreements have broad management 
rights clauses,53 a unionized company’s formalized contractual gov-
ernance structure limits management’s and workers’ flexibility and 
discretion. Revising contractual terms via the collective bargaining 
process is difficult and costly.54 By the same token, the inability to 
revise the employer-employee relationship in response to external 
market changes is also costly, all the more so in today’s rapidly 
changing and highly competitive economic environment. 
 Ultimately, the workplace choice between informal nonunion gov-
ernance—that is, employer fiat—and formal union governance should 
depend on the answers to two questions. First, does management dis-
cretion or union governance better handle the contractual problems 
found in all workplaces—match-specific investments, asymmetric in-
formation, risk, and transaction costs? For example, if management 
can behave opportunistically and appropriate quasi-rents from im-
mobile workers with little loss in firm reputation or worker produc-
tivity, then a formalized union contractual relationship becomes at-
tractive. To the extent that unions can and do behave opportunisti-
cally by appropriating quasi-rents from shareholders to acquire wage 
premiums, then the union form becomes less attractive. The second 
question is, how competitive and dynamic are product and resource 
markets? Where changes in technology, product markets, and finan-
cial markets are rapid, the costs of inflexibility or sluggishness in a 
formalized environment are more severe. In such an environment, 
the greater discretion and flexibility associated with nonunion gov-
ernance are distinct advantages. 
 We contend that sectoral and technological changes, coupled with 
rising competition in the U.S. and world economies, increasingly tilt 
labor-contracting preferences toward nonunion governance.55  Out-
side of today’s formalized union sector, most workers are employed in 
firms where workplace governance is subject to constrained manage-
rial discretion. At least as important, competition for employees re-
 52. As Wachter notes, transaction costs are exacerbated in the face of more match-
specific investments and information asymmetries, as the need to regulate a higher poten-
tial for opportunistic behavior is more costly. See Wachter, supra note 34, at 170. 
 53. See, e.g., St. George Warehouse, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 904, 907, 927 (2004) (finding 
employer’s proposal for broad management rights clause—which would allow it complete 
discretion over hiring; promotions; discipline for cause; demotions; transfers; layoffs; re-
calls; setting productivity standards; contracting with third-parties to supply personnel; 
closing, expanding, or relocating its facility; ceasing any job; and changing methods of op-
eration—to be lawful).
 54. See Wachter, supra note 34, at 170. 
 55. See supra notes 10-11, 20-23 and accompanying text. 
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quires that companies provide sufficient compensation and acquire a 
reputation that will enable them to attract, motivate, and maintain a 
productive work force.56
 In today’s economy, union governance has proven to be an expen-
sive minority model. The disadvantage of traditional unionism in the 
United States is most apparent in the effect of unions on profitability, 
investment, growth, and other aspects of firm performance, where 
improvements in productivity fail to offset the costs of union compen-
sation premiums.57 Any profitability gap between union and non-
union firms is sure to fuel and maintain strong management oppo-
sition to union organizing.58 As long as there is a gap in firm per-
formance, managerial discretion will remain the dominant form of 
workplace governance. 
 The dominance of managerial discretion over contractual govern-
ance suggests that the future labor relations environment will look 
much like it does today, with no major resurgence of unionization on 
the horizon—at least traditional unions in the style envisaged by the 
NLRA.59 In the following section, we identify alternative paths that 
might lead to workplace gains in a world in which traditional col-
lective governance continues to lose relevance. The NLRA, how-
ever, still retains some significance, for both better and worse. 
Under the alternatives proposed here, the NLRA could enjoy in-
creased relevance by fostering a new model of collective action that 
makes society better off. 
III.   UNFULFILLED DESIRES OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES
A.   What Workers Want 
 The purpose of this Article is to outline alternative paths that, al-
though not politically likely, could lead to workplace gains in a world 
where private sector unionism remains limited. To assess what gains 
may be possible, we begin by asking what workers want. Labor re-
forms should address the concerns of workers while taking into ac-
count their impact on employers and the economy, such as invest-
 56. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Hirsch, supra note 42, at 431-34. 
 58. There is some circularity here. No doubt much of management opposition to un-
ions is the result of higher per unit costs and less management discretion. But a hostile at-
titude by management toward unions also makes it less likely one will see an enhancement 
in performance owing to cooperation and collective voice within union companies. 
59. This assumes no significant change in the NLRA’s statutory language, such as 
narrowing the supervisory exception to the definition of an employee or requiring certifica-
tion of a union based on a card-check majority, which could result in a substantial increase 
in union membership. 
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ment and job creation. Worker concerns, at least to the extent they 
touch on collective action, are expressly protected by the NLRA.60
 In the early 1990s, the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations (commonly known as the “Dunlop Commis-
sion”) administered the Worker Representation and Participation 
Survey. The results of this survey, along with similar surveys in 
other countries, are comprehensively analyzed by Richard Freeman 
and Joel Rogers in What Workers Want.61 The survey results paint a 
picture of significant unmet employee desires. First, many workers 
want greater voice and participation in workplace decision-making, 
although they seek individual voice as much as the collective right to 
be heard associated with traditional unions.62 Second, workers want 
a more cooperative and less adversarial worker-management rela-
tionship, coupled with managerial support for entities that foster 
worker participation.63 Third, workers want not just to express them-
selves but also to have their views affect workplace outcomes in 
meaningful ways.64 And fourth, workers see management resistance 
as the primary obstacle to worker participation and cooperation.65
Despite some differences, the expressed desires and concerns of 
workers are frequently similar in union and nonunion workplaces.66
 We draw several inferences from these results. One conclusion is 
that the current system often leads to an underproduction of worker 
voice and participation, as well as worker-management cooperation, 
in both union and nonunion workplaces.67 Moreover, the adversarial 
 60. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. 
 61. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21; see also Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee 
Participation/Representation Gap: An Assessment and Proposed Solution, 3 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 491, 491-92 (2001) (evaluating the conclusions drawn by Freeman and Rogers 
from the worker survey). 
 62. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 32-33, 81-84. Approximately 50 million 
employees (union and nonunion) wanted more voice at work, while nearly one-third (15 
million) of nonunion employees of all but the smallest private sector firms wanted union 
representation and over 90% of unionized employees wanted to keep their union represen-
tation. See Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 187, 197-98 (2001) (citing FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra
note 21). 
 63. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 33, 84-88. 
 64. Id. at 75-79, 86-87. Freeman and Rogers note that the biggest gap in the amount 
of influence that employees want, versus what they actually have, involves issues of bene-
fits and pay, followed by training, and (to a much smaller degree) determining how and 
when to perform work. Id. at 79. 
 65. Id. at 33, 88-91. See Weiler, supra note 62, at 187 (noting that 79% of nonunion 
employees said that employees visibly seeking unionization would very likely lose their 
jobs and 41% said that they would personally lose their job if they were identified as being 
involved in a union campaign). 
 66. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 52. 
 67. See David I. Levine & Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the 
Firm’s Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183, 235-36 
(Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990).  
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relationship envisioned and reinforced by the NLRA does not appeal 
to workers. Finally, greater voice and cooperation are unlikely to evolve 
from the current status quo. These inferences open the door for potential 
societal gains through welfare-enhancing regulatory reforms.68
 We identify four criteria by which labor regulation reforms should 
be evaluated while recognizing that tradeoffs among the criteria may 
exist.69 First, proposals should be “welfare-enhancing” for the parties 
and the economy.70 Second, reforms should facilitate enhanced voice 
(including some freedom to choose whether and how to exercise that 
voice), encourage cooperation and discourage costly conflict, and in-
crease the flow of information within nonunion workplaces. Third, 
any arrangement should constrain rent-seeking and opportunistic 
behavior by workers and employers. Fourth, reforms should allow for 
variation across heterogeneous workplaces and be flexible over time. 
 There are several paths that might encourage welfare-enhancing 
workplace governance. We focus on nonunion workplaces, although 
what happens in the nonunion sector will affect outcomes in the un-
ion sector. By “nonunion,” however, we include ventures sponsored by 
unions that do not follow the traditional union form. Indeed, we an-
ticipate that unions will be an important catalyst for new workplace 
governance structures, with such innovations taking on an increas-
ingly significant role as long as union density remains low. Accord-
ingly, we propose alternatives that reduce legal impediments to non-
traditional forms of workplace governance, with the hope that these 
labor law and employment regulation reforms can provide at least 
modest social welfare gains. Before discussing these alternatives, 
however, we identify some recent workplace governance innovations 
that may establish the foundation for the future of private sector 
collective action. 
B.   What Workers Get 
 The vast majority of private sector workers will never have an 
opportunity to engage in collective voice and participation via tradi-
tional unionism.71 Yet, despite legal hurdles to nontraditional work-
place governance schemes,72 the use of innovative “work groups”73 is 
 68. See infra Part IV. 
 69. For example, under certain circumstances, increasing worker voice while limiting 
rent-seeking behavior among workers may be mutually exclusive. 
 70. For a definition of welfare-enhancing reform, see supra p. 1135 & n.4. The value 
to the parties of an enterprise can be defined as the sum of shareholder profits plus 
worker rents (the excess of compensation over opportunity costs). See John M. Abowd, 
The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm, 79 AM. ECON. REV.
774, 777 (1989) (developing and applying this definition of enterprise value). 
 71. See supra Part II.A. 
 72. See infra Parts IV.A, -E. 
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growing rapidly. No doubt due to their recent lack of success at gain-
ing members,74 traditional unions have been at the forefront of devel-
oping new and different ways to reach and serve the interests of 
workers. Whether these innovations are intended solely to boost tra-
ditional union membership or are merely a reflection of unions’ con-
cern for workers, they represent potentially vital tools for providing 
voice and participation to nonunion private sector employees. Al-
though the use of welfare-enhancing work groups is expanding, they 
face legal obstacles and reach only a small percentage of private-
sector employees; thus, labor reforms should seek to further encour-
age their development. 
 Unions increasingly seek to organize workers outside the typical 
NLRA election process.75 One popular technique is to organize work-
ers around issues other than those directly implicating workplace 
concerns. The Service Employees International Union (SEIU), for ex-
ample, successfully organized janitors in Santa Clara County, Cali-
fornia, despite significant hurdles that included the mostly Mexican 
immigrant workers’ low English-language and job skills.76 The 
SEIU’s success was based in large part on a campaign that centered 
on Mexican culture, involved religious and political leaders, and used 
publicity techniques—including demonstrations and boycotts against 
high-tech companies such as Apple Computer that hired the cleaning 
contractors employing the janitors.77 As union density levels remain 
 73. We refer to work groups broadly as any entity in which employees participate and 
that serves some interest of employees. This use is similar to the “employee involvement” 
programs that Freeman and Rogers define as including such disparate entities as “quality 
circles and discussion groups, total quality management, self-directed work teams, safety 
committees, production committees, [holiday] party committees,” and other small groups 
that work on certain issues. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 129. 
 74. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
 75. For example, unions have increasingly sought to avoid the Board’s election proc-
ess by convincing employers, and pressing for legislation that would require employers, to 
bargain with unions that have been selected by a majority of employees who signed cards 
in support of the union. See, e.g., Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007). 
The bill would require employers to recognize a union that obtains majority support from 
employees via a “card-check” (cards signed by employees stating that they want the union 
to represent them). In 2007, the House of Representatives passed the bill, which ultimately 
failed in the Senate because supporters were not able to garner enough votes to end de-
bate. See Supporters of Card Check Bill Fall Short of Votes Needed to Limit Senate Debate,
DAILY LAB. REP., June 27, 2007, at AA-2. Surprisingly, a majority of House members—in a 
then-Republican-majority House—signed on to the 2005 version of the bill as co-sponsors. 
See Majority of House Likely to Co-Sponsor ‘Card Check’ Bill, AFL-CIO Official Says,
DAILY LABOR REP., May 9, 2006, at A-6.  
 76. See STONE, supra note 10, at 224-25 (describing Justice for Janitors campaign and 
other nontraditional union organizations); Alan Hyde, Employee Organization in Silicon 
Valley: Networks, Ethnic Organization, and New Unions, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 493, 
497 (2002).
 77. See Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond: 
A New Form of Unionism in the Twenty-first Century?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS:
NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 22 (Phanindra V. Wunnava ed., 2004) (examining rea-
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low, unions are likely to increase their use of such innovative strate-
gies. Indeed, the 2005 split in the AFL-CIO was prompted by the be-
lief of the SEIU and other major unions joining the Change To Win 
Coalition that the AFL-CIO’s organizing efforts were too conserva-
tive.78 Attempts at innovative organizing have also led to the forma-
tion of work groups that do not act as traditional unions but provide 
an opportunity for worker voice. 
 These nontraditional work groups include a growing trend by un-
ions forming affiliate organizations that do not deal with employers 
on behalf of their members. For example, the AFL-CIO’s “Working 
America” affiliate consists of members who are associated with labor 
generally but are not formally represented by a union.79 Its main 
purpose has been to encourage action on local and national political 
issues; yet, its potential to activate members for other projects is sig-
nificant.80 For example, Working America recently created a web site 
that contains a database with information on over 60,000 companies, 
including executive compensation, overseas outsourcing, and labor 
and employment violations.81 This type of information may be valu-
able to workers, arguably reducing information asymmetries and, in 
some cases, the employer opportunistic behavior such asymmetries 
allow.82 However, to the extent that information provided by nontra-
ditional worker groups or the employer is unreliable or systemati-
cally biased, it becomes more difficult to draw inferences regarding 
the efficiency of enhanced communications. 
 Another interesting example of the increasingly blurry line be-
tween traditional unionism and less formal work groups is the alli-
sons for success of Justice for Janitors campaign and asking whether a similar approach 
would succeed more generally); see also Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in 
the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 753, 951-54 (1994) (discussing historical examples of joint union-management coun-
cils); Hyde, supra note 76, at 497; see also Estlund, supra note 2, at 1604-06 (describing 
“corporate campaigns,” in which unions use alternative methods of increasing economic 
pressure on an employer—such as by targeting the employer’s customers). 
 78. See Michelle Amber, SEIU, IBT Disaffiliate from AFL-CIO, Announce Plan to Set 
Up New Federation, DAILY LABOR REP., July 26, 2005, at AA-1. 
 79. See Richard B. Freeman, From the Webbs to the Web: The Contribution of the 
Internet to Reviving Union Fortunes 8, 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 11298, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11298; Alan Hyde, New Insti-
tutions for Worker Representation in the United States: Some Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 385, 387 (2006). The AFL-CIO also initiated an associate member program 
that allowed nonunion or unemployed workers to pay reduced dues and enjoy certain privi-
leges of union membership. See STONE, supra note 10, at 218 (noting that the AFL-CIO’s 
primary goal was to support possible future organizing efforts). 
 80. See Freeman, supra note 79, at 19; Hyde, supra note 79, at 389. 
 81. See Amy Joyce, Labor Web Site Keeps Tabs on Business: Workers Can Check Ex-
ecutive Salaries, Company Violations, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2005, at D3 (noting also simi-
lar actions by two groups that monitor Wal-Mart’s conduct). The Working America data-
base is available at http://www.workingamerica.org/jobtracker. 
 82. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
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ance between the AFL-CIO and the National Day Laborer Organiz-
ing Network (NDLON). In announcing their alliance, the groups ex-
pressed their intent to form a National Worker Center Partnership, 
which would further support community-based entities called 
“worker centers,” which act as advocates for nonunion workers and 
provide a large range of services to enhance both collective and indi-
vidual voice.83 Worker centers already have a significant presence in 
the U.S., with over 140 centers in 31 states.84
 These new work groups aptly show how employee voice can be 
satisfied through alternative institutions and that such institutions 
can transform and evolve over time. The “WashTech” affiliate of the 
Communication Workers of America (CWA), for instance, trans-
formed from a nonbargaining entity to one that sought formal bar-
gaining status and ultimately led to the creation of several entirely 
different work groups.85 The CWA initially formed WashTech only to 
assist and lobby on behalf of Microsoft independent contractors and 
temporary help agency workers, but it has begun to seek recognition 
on behalf of some technology workers—and it even obtained card 
check recognition from one employer.86 WashTech’s success prompted 
the CWA to form a national website for all technology workers, and 
other unions have followed suit.87
 The examples above illustrate the possibility of providing services 
to workers through innovative organizations not directly tied to the 
workplace—that is, outside the traditional collective bargaining proc-
ess. Although these groups have potential, they will not necessarily 
flourish or become widespread. Such efforts are costly both in the ini-
tial and ongoing stages, and the union and philanthropic foundation 
funds needed to support these groups are limited. Monies will flow to 
these organizations only if they provide benefits greater than alter-
native uses of scarce funds. 
 More fundamentally, as pointed out by Joni Hersch, there is a ba-
sic tension in such organizations that may limit their development.88
 83. See Michelle Amber, AFL-CIO, Day Laborers Group Sign Pact to Advance Worker, 
Immigration Rights, DAILY LABOR REP., Aug. 10, 2006, at A-4 (noting that some worker 
centers may also provide legal services). 
 84. See id. NDLON already operates the largest association of worker centers, with 
more than 40 centers focused on issues affecting day laborers. Id. Approximately 25 other 
day labor centers operated by 28 other groups also exist. See id. 
 85. STONE, supra note 10, at 235. 
 86. See id. at 235; Hyde, supra note 79, at 390-91; see also id. at 410-14 (discussing 
other examples of membership-based “alternative worker organizations”). 
 87. See Freeman, supra note 79, at 18-20 (describing International Association of Ma-
chinist’s “Cyberlodge,” Steelworkers union’s open membership plan, and the Service Em-
ployees International Union’s (SEIU)’s “Purple Ocean”). 
 88. See Joni Hersch, A Workers’ Lobby to Provide Portable Benefits, in EMERGING 
LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 207 (Richard B. Freeman 
et al. eds., 2005). 
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Hersch asks whether a large interest group not attached to the 
workplace can successfully provide services to workers and lobby for 
their well-being. 89 Hersch examines in some detail the experience of 
Working Today, which began as a group broadly focused on services 
and lobbying for independent workers but evolved into a group claim-
ing an overriding social agenda while focusing more narrowly on 
making benefits portable across jobs.90 Generalizing from this analy-
sis, Hersch models a group that provides services, lobbies, and repre-
sents members.91 Tension arises because the organization provides a 
good that is partly public—that is, its benefits spill over to nonmem-
bers.92 It must attract members based on the private goods it pro-
vides while raising money from foundations or large entities inter-
ested in the public outcome.93 The implication drawn by Hersch is 
that there is no common blueprint for such an organization—
different types of groups can and will arise.94 But their success and 
growth is not guaranteed.95
 As described in more detail below, work groups can provide a di-
verse set of services for workers and satisfy to some degree the desire 
for workplace voice and participation. 96 The NLRA, however, has not 
been hospitable to these nontraditional work groups, effectively re-
ducing the choice set for most workers to either traditional unions or 
management discretion (albeit constrained), with little in between.97
What follows, therefore, are proposals to make the NLRA more open 
to welfare-enhancing innovations that facilitate worker voice, par-
 89. See id. at 207-08, 226-28.
 90. Id. at 212-16. In 2003, Working Today’s benefit and advocacy services were re-
named the “Freelancers Union.” See Freelancers Union, About Us, available at 
http://www.freelancersunion.org/about-us-home/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2007). 
 91. Hersch, supra note 88, at 216-18. 
 92. See id.
 93. See id.
 94. Id. at 227-28.
 95. See id. at 226-28.
 96. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text. 
 97. Alex Bryson and Richard Freeman find that underlying preferences among work-
ers are roughly similar in the U.S. and the U.K., but that workplace outcomes differ be-
cause the U.K. provides a greater range of institutional options than does the U.S. Alex 
Bryson & Richard B. Freeman, Worker Needs and Voice in the US and the UK 22 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12310, 2006), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12310. The authors conclude, 
The different choices on offer in the two countries appear to affect the different 
responses of UK and US workers to fairly similar workplace needs/problems. 
The dichotomous choice between collective bargaining and no representation in 
the US produces a smaller rate of unionization in the US that manifests itself 
in greater unfilled demand for unions among non-union workers than in the 
UK; whereas the wider choice of voice institutions in the UK attracts many to 
take the free rider option. 
Id.
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ticipation, and cooperation in the workplace, in particular for private 
sector nonunion workers. 
IV.   ENCOURAGING WORKER VOICE AND PARTICIPATION IN NONUNION 
WORKPLACES
A.   Reforming the NLRA’s “Company Union” Prohibition 
 Any discussion of expanding the development of nontraditional 
work groups must focus on the NLRA’s broad “company union” pro-
hibition. This prohibition, as currently interpreted by the NLRB, lim-
its employers’ ability to lawfully establish work groups that may pro-
vide welfare-enhancing employee voice and participation. Accord-
ingly, we propose a legislative modification that would significantly 
reduce the number and types of groups that fall under the company 
union ban. 
 In its attempt to prevent employer-controlled unions via section 
8(a)(2) and, by inclusion, section 2(5),98 the NLRA also limits less for-
mal employer-sponsored work groups—even those that do not bar-
gain on behalf of employees. Section 8(a)(2) prohibits employer domi-
nation or support for any labor organization.99 Section 2(5) defines a 
“labor organization” as any entity in which employees participate and 
which has a purpose to deal with employers over grievances, dis-
putes, wages, pay rates, hours of employment, or work conditions.100
 The legitimate goals underlying the inclusion of section 8(a)(2) in 
the 1935 Wagner Act include an attempt to prevent employer-
dominated work groups that would interfere with employees’ freedom 
to choose an independent, traditional union and to bar representation 
that, because of ties to employers, was viewed as inherently 
flawed.101 The fear that employers may create entities that interfere 
 98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2) (2000).  
 99. Id. § 158(a)(2) (making it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to dominate or 
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization”). 
 100. Id. § 152(5) (defining labor organization as “any organization of any kind, or any 
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate 
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers con-
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or condi-
tions of work”). 
 101. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 992-94 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 
(7th Cir. 1994); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 129-33 (describing “employer coercion” and 
“false consciousness” rationales); Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the 
Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 174-76 (1993) (discussing 
possible rationales of section 8(a)(2)); LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1661-62 (noting that many 
early twentieth-century employee participation groups were progressive, but other em-
ployers created such groups in anticipation of federal labor legislation and in hopes of bar-
ring independent unions from the workplace). An informative volume edited by Bruce 
Kaufman and Daphne Gottlieb Taras includes several papers examining company-
supported worker groups in the U.S. and in Canada. See NONUNION EMPLOYEE 
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with employees’ choice whether or not to seek collective representa-
tion led to section 2(5)’s broad definition of “labor organization,” 
which the Board subsequently expanded further.102
 The Board has concluded that it will classify an entity as a labor 
organization under section 2(5) “if (1) employees participate, (2) the 
organization exists, at least in part, for the purpose of ‘dealing with’ 
employers, and (3) these dealings concern ‘conditions of work’ or con-
cern other statutory subjects [listed in section 2(5)], such as griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, or hours of employ-
ment.”103 The current expansive reach of section 2(5), and by exten-
sion section 8(a)(2), results in large part from the Board’s interpreta-
tion of “dealing with employers.” According to the Board, an entity is 
“dealing with” an employer wherever there is a “bilateral mechanism 
involving proposals from [an] employee committee concerning the 
subjects listed in Sec[tion] 2(5), coupled with real or apparent consid-
eration of those proposals by management.”104 In particular, “dealing”
is present if there is “a pattern or practice in which a group of em-
ployees, over time, makes proposals to management, management 
responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or 
deed, and compromise is not required.”105 The Board has broadly in-
terpreted this definition to cover entities with no formal structure, 
even if they have no elected officers, bylaws, regular meetings, or 
dues and do not engage in anything close to collective bargaining.106
Any employer support or control over such an organization—for in-
stance, creating the group or running its meetings—violates section 
8(a)(2).107
REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY (Bruce E. Kaufman & 
Daphne Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000) [hereinafter NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION].
 102. See Barenberg, supra note 7, at 1459 & n.347 (citing, as examples, NLRB v. Pa. 
Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1938); Int’l Harvester Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 310, 354 
(1936); Wheeling Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 699, 710 (1936)). 
 103. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994. 
 104. Id. at 995 n.21 (stating also that “[a] unilateral mechanism, such as a ‘suggestion 
box,’ or ‘brainstorming’ groups or meetings, or analogous information exchanges, does not 
constitute ‘dealing with’ ”). Since the Supreme Court’s 1959 decision in National Labor Re-
lations Board v. Cabot Carbon Co, “dealing with” has been interpreted more broadly than 
“collective bargaining.” See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 210-13 (1959). Elec-
tromation also suggested, but ultimately did not decide, that a labor organization must 
serve in some sort of representational capacity. See 309 N.L.R.B. at 944 n.20. The Board’s 
interpretation of section 2(5)’s scope came in part as a reaction to some courts’ more nar-
row interpretation of “labor organization.” See id. at 996-97 (rejecting NLRB v. Scott & 
Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 295 (6th Cir. 1982) (requiring employees to believe that an entity 
is a union to constitute a “labor organization” under section 2(5))). 
 105. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993). 
 106. See Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 993-94 (concluding that legislative history of 
section 8(a)(2) required a broad interpretation of “labor organization” in order to ban “em-
ployee representation committees,” which had little formal structure); Estreicher, supra
note 32, at 126 & n.3 (1994) (citing Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203).
 107. See E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 897-98; Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995. 
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 The expansiveness of these provisions restricts development of 
nonunion vehicles for employer-employee cooperation and productiv-
ity-enhancing worker voice.108 This is because the NLRA allows no 
middle ground—employees often must choose between traditional un-
ion representation or no representation at all.109
 One of many illustrations of the vast reach of the company union 
prohibition is the Board’s decision in Grouse Mountain Lodge.110 The 
employer in that case operated a Montana resort that was facing an 
organizing campaign.111 Among several unfair labor practices occur-
ring during the campaign, the Board found that the employer vio-
lated section 8(a)(2) because of its support for the “Quality Assurance 
(QA) Committee.”112 The QA Committee consisted of a suggestion box 
and various meetings; all employees were invited to the meetings, 
where they could offer ideas to management and discuss issues such 
as work conditions, guest matters, and safety concerns.113 Although 
the QA Committee had no structural documents, bylaws, or proce-
dures, the Board found that it was a labor organization.114 According 
to the Board, the QA Committee satisfied the “dealing with” re-
quirement, in part, because the employer sought input from the com-
mittee about what should be served for employees’ free lunches and 
for which holidays overtime pay should be provided.115 It is difficult 
to imagine how this type of employer-employee interaction interferes 
with employees’ labor rights. This type of virtually structureless 
feedback is often indispensable to companies in the modern economy; 
the Board’s current company union jurisprudence unjustifiably treats 
such beneficial interactions as unlawful. 
 The potential benefits of employer-supported work groups are 
widespread, although not universal.116 In some cases, managers will 
 108. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1545-46 (discussing different approaches that Con-
gress may have taken in 1935). 
 109. See id. at 1546. 
 110. 333 N.L.R.B. 1322 (2001), enforced, 56 F. App’x 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 111. Id. at 1328. 
 112. Id. at 1334-37. 
 113. Id. at 1335. 
 114. Id. at 1335-37. 
 115. Id. at 1336 (concluding that suggestions and ideas initially raised by individual 
employees are “debated amongst the employees . . . who have attended the meeting, some-
times altered, and then submitted to the [employer] in the name of QA program rather than 
as an individual employee’s suggestion. Thereafter, the [employer] either accepts or rejects 
the ideas or returns them to the next QA program meeting for further development.”). 
 116. Studies examining employee participation programs typically conclude that they 
have positive (if not always large) effects on productivity and employee earnings, but do 
not in general decrease per unit labor costs and increase profitability. See Hirsch, supra 
note 49, at 968-76, 982 (discussing benefits of employee participation in workplace deci-
sion-making and citing studies). See Peter Cappelli & David Neumark, Do “High Perform-
ance” Work Practices Improve Establishment-Level Outcomes?, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 737 (2001) (discussing methodological difficulties in measuring causal effects of 
workplace organization, surveying prior studies, and providing longitudinal evidence). 
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enthusiastically adopt measures to enhance opportunities for em-
ployee voice to take advantage of the production improvements and 
increased job satisfaction gained from employee input; in other cases, 
managers will adopt such measures by necessity to remain competi-
tive in the marketplace.117 In sharp contrast to the strictly hierarchi-
cal manufacturing model of the 1930s, such input is considerably 
more important in the modern economy, where the need for workers 
to think and make suggestions is much higher than when the NLRA 
was enacted.118 Employee work groups may also provide an alterna-
tive to resolve workplace disputes that both employers and employees 
find more beneficial than other methods.119 Employers that are open 
to more employee voice may also discover that employees develop 
more loyalty and attachment to the firm.120
 Labor law reform relaxing the Board’s current company union 
prohibition would effectively expand choices for many employees. 
Employees who have little prospect for seeing formal collective bar-
gaining in their workplace would have the option to take part in a 
Lowering the cost of adopting such programs should increase their use and increase 
economy-wide productivity. 
 117. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 7, 131-35 (describing survey results 
showing that a significant number of managers favor more employee voice in joint work 
committees and discussing productivity gains possible through employee involvement pro-
grams); Weiler, supra note 62, at 198-200; cf. Hirsch, supra note 49, at 982 (citing data on 
employee ownership effects on firm performance). But see LEVINE, supra note 11, at 63 
(stating that “[m]any middle- and lower-level managers resist and sometimes sabotage 
employee involvement” because greater employee autonomy “may be threatening to super-
visors and managers”). 
 118. See Barenberg, supra note 77, at 885-90, 927 n.826 (discussing numerous exam-
ples of successful flexible work teams and citing studies showing improvement in produc-
tivity, quality, and innovation from increased employee involvement); Estreicher, supra
note 32, at 135-39 (describing importance of “smart” workers who can fully understand the 
business, make use of new technologies, and make suggestions to the employer). 
 119. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 164-67 (discussing workplace commit-
tees that monitor labor standards); Hyde, supra note 101, at 152-54 (describing advantages 
of “works councils” over other responses to work grievances, such as quitting, internalizing 
omplaints, or litigating). c
120. See Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Ex-
ception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 133-35 (1993) (discussing the benefits 
of the “shared enterprise” model of employment in Germany and Japan). The potential 
benefits of employer-run work groups have been recognized in other areas as well. For ex-
ample, a failed amendment to the Occupational Health and Safety Act would have re-
quired health and safety committees in most workplaces. See H.R. 1280, 103d Cong. § 201 
(1993); H.R. 3160, 102nd Cong. § 201 (1991); see also Estlund, supra note 2, at 1541 n.69 
(citing Gregory R. Watchman, Safe and Sound: The Case for Safety and Health Committees 
Under OSHA and the NLRA, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 82-89 (1994)) (stating that 
such groups can improve safety); Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Representation Outside the 
Labor Act: Thoughts on Arbitral Representation, Group Arbitration, and Workplace Com-
mittees, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 75, 93-100 (2002) (discussing state legislation mandat-
ing workplace safety committees); Randy S. Rabinowitz & Mark M. Hager, Designing 
Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada, 33 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 373, 431 (2000) (discussing a possible correlation between employee in-
volvement in health and safety committees and reduced workplace accidents).
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group that provides some outlet for voice while enjoying NLRA pro-
tection for their participation. 
 The possible gains from the flexibility and ingenuity of employer-
supported work groups are well illustrated by the variety in the 
structure of the groups themselves. Avenues for employee voice may 
arise from groups formed for nonproduction purposes, such as a di-
versity committee. Moreover, other entities—such as work teams 
that concentrate on certain projects or production issues or groups 
that are focused on procedures, policies, or rules—can foster em-
ployee input and feedback.121 It is not surprising, therefore, that 
studies have shown that the use of some form of employee work 
group is reasonably widespread and growing.122
 Although unions are concerned that employer-supported work 
groups might replace them,123 it is also possible that the process of 
electing worker representatives or exercising voice in nonunion com-
panies would complement the organization of traditional unions.124
Other countries have much higher union density rates, even though 
they do not foreclose employer-initiated or -supported work groups 
that might engage in discussions over compensation and working 
conditions. For example, employer-supported nonunion work 
groups are permitted and not uncommon in Canada,125 where tra-
 121. See Estreicher, supra note 32, at 127 (describing production-focused groups as 
“on-line,” as distinguished from nonproduction “off-line” groups). 
 122. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 119, 120 exhibit 5.1 (describing reports 
that one-third of employees said their employer met with committees of employees to re-
solve problems and over half said their employer had some form of an employee involve-
ment system); LEVINE, supra note 11, at 7 (citing study showing that in 1990, “88 percent 
of responding [Fortune 1000] companies had at least 1 percent of their workers involved in 
employee-involvement programs”); Bruce E. Kaufman, Does the NLRA Constrain Employee 
Involvement and Participation Programs in Nonunion Companies?: A Reassessment, 17 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 729, 747-54 (1999) (describing results of various studies and noting 
that most of these groups are probably not affected by section 8(a)(2)). 
 123. See Jonathon P. Hiatt & Laurence E. Gold, Employer-Employee Committees: A Un-
ion Perspective, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 101, at 498, 507-08. 
 124. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1544, 1551, 1601 (arguing that allowing employer 
work groups might spur innovation among unions); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 153-54; 
Barenberg, supra note 77, at 831-35 (discussing pre-NLRA company unions morphing into 
traditional, independent unions); Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What 
Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 145 (2003) (noting that “[t]he steel un-
ions and the National Education Association . . . evolved in part from company unions”). 
But see FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 141-44 (describing survey results show-
ing that workers at firms with employee involvement programs have less interest in 
traditional unions, although noting that such programs at unionized firms do not 
lessen union support).
 125. For an informative history of Canada’s law in this area, see LeRoy, supra note 11, 
at 1669-73; see also Weiler, supra note 62, at 199 n.44 (noting the broad array of employee 
involvement programs permitted under Canadian labor law).
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ditional  unions and collective bargaining operate at levels higher 
than in the U.S.126
 Some countries, Germany being the prime example, mandate 
that some form of elected employee work group be available to work-
ers—a right that has now been adopted by the European Union.127
German employers are often supportive of these “works councils,” 
finding that a good working relationship with them is productive.128
More to the point, German works councils are often closely tied to 
trade unions and have historically fed unions with new members.129
It is true, however, that although activation of a works council is a 
simple process, workers do not find it necessary in a sizable share of 
German workplaces, and the recent decline in works council mem-
bers reinforces a slide in union membership.130
Further, China’s government-sponsored union, which does not 
typically engage in collective bargaining, has done what previously 
seemed impossible: convince Wal-Mart to voluntarily allow the union 
to represent all of its employees in that country.131 It is not clear 
what influence the Chinese union will have on Wal-Mart’s operations 
 126. See Kaufman, supra note 122, at 805-08 (arguing that Canadian union density of 
34% is due, in part, to independent unions co-opting employer-initiated work groups and a 
legal regime that better protects employee free choice).
 127. The European Union Charter contains a provision establishing a fundamental 
right of workers or their representatives to information and consultation in the workplace. 
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 27, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 15, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/unit/charte/en/charter-solidarity.html. Paul 
Weiler has suggested that the U.S. adopt basically the same requirements as Germany. 
See WEILER, supra note 8, at 282-95. Others have made similar suggestions. See, e.g.,
Hyde, supra note 101, at 152-53 & n.9 (discussing adopting works councils similar to those 
required in France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands); Summers, supra note 120, at 
131 (supporting adopting modified versions of the German works councils system and ar-
guing that the U.S. can learn much from the German and Japanese experience); Richard 
B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation in a Nonunion 
Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 13, 
63 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (suggesting encouragement of such 
groups through government incentives). 
 128. See Summers, supra note 120, at 132-33 (noting that Japanese employers typi-
cally accept that country’s similar “enterprise unions” as well); see also CHARLES C.
HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING 
CORPORATION 177-231 (1988) (arguing for “associational unions” that exist to develop and 
enforce agreements at a specific employer); LEVINE, supra note 11, at 3-4, 115-21 (discuss-
ing widespread employee involvement in Europe and Japan). 
 129. See John T. Addison et al., The (Parlous) State of German Unions, 28 JOURNAL OF 
LABOR RES. 3, 10 (2007). 
 130. Id. at 13-14 (showing that in 2004, just one in ten German establishments had 
works councils in the private sector, which included 47% of all employees in Western Ger-
many and 38% in Eastern Germany (the significantly higher employee- versus estab-
lishment-density resulting because works councils exist primarily at larger establish-
ments)). In addition to declining union density, there also has been greater decentraliza-
tion of bargaining. Id.
 131. See David Barboza, Wal-Mart Will Unionize in All of China, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 
2006, at C4. 
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in that country. However, it is hard to imagine that having Wal-Mart 
or other nonunion companies in the U.S. engage in discussions with 
worker representatives will result in lower private sector union den-
sity than would otherwise exist. 
 This diversity of employer-supported worker participation 
schemes illustrates the ability of work groups to adapt to the unique 
circumstances of a wide variety of companies, workers, and societies. 
Such flexibility and innovation provide more promise for employee 
participation and voice in the private sector than do traditional un-
ions, although management and workers in many establishments 
will not opt to implement vehicles for employee voice. We should see 
adoption of employer-supported work groups where such activity has 
the greatest potential benefit. These potential benefits from nonunion 
work groups are currently limited, to some unknown degree, by the 
NLRA’s expansive company union prohibition. To the extent that 
employer-supported work groups created as a result of NLRA reforms 
prove effective, competitive pressures will induce their adoption by 
other companies. If ineffective, such reforms will have little impact.  
 By making many of these groups unlawful—particularly the most 
effective ones, which often involve substantial interactions between 
employees and management—the NLRA’s company union ban has 
impeded the development of groups that could provide significant 
improvement for workers, employers, society, and possibly even tra-
ditional unions. Consequently, we support modification of the 
NLRA’s prohibition against employer-sponsored work groups. A 
change that best reflects our four reform criteria132 would maintain 
restrictions against company domination of traditional unions while 
permitting the development of less formal work groups in nonunion 
companies. These work groups would not participate in formal collec-
tive bargaining, but could communicate with management and par-
ticipate in workplace discussions, including those regarding pay, 
grievances, and working conditions. 
 Our recommendation is to change section 2(5)’s definition of “la-
bor organization”133 to include only those entities that have been cer-
tified by the Board or recognized by an employer as the exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative of a unit of employees under section 
9 of the NLRA.134 The modification would permit employers to create 
or maintain work groups that discuss terms and conditions of em-
ployment, so long as those groups are not labor organizations as de-
 132. See supra p. 1147. 
 133. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000). 
 134. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), -(c), -(e) (2000) (stating Board’s certification process and au-
thority to evaluate questions about whether an exclusive bargaining representative enjoys 
support from a majority of employees). 
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fined by the revised section 2(5).135 This offers employers virtually 
unfettered opportunity to promote the sharing of information without 
the specter of a section 8(a)(2) violation while maintaining the major 
policy aims of that provision. Section 8(a)(2)’s goal of preventing em-
ployers from coercing or misleading employees into thinking that 
they have independent representation would be maintained, as em-
ployees would be well aware whether or not they are represented by 
an independent union. Moreover, as is currently the case, an em-
ployer would still be unable to discuss conditions of employment with 
its work group if there was already a union on the scene.136
 Unlike other proposals, such as the failed TEAM Act,137 which do 
not call for changes to the definition of labor organization, the pro-
 135. This proposal has similarities with a proposal made by Samuel Estreicher, see
Estreicher, supra note 32, at 150 (proposing “limiting section 2(5)’s definition of ‘labor or-
ganization’ to entities that ‘bargain with’ their employer over terms and conditions of em-
ployment”), and a House-passed Taft-Hartley bill in 1947, see H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 54 
(1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
1947, at 345 (1948) [hereinafter HISTORY] (stating that it would not be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer to form or maintain “a committee of employees and [to discuss] 
with it matters of mutual interest, including [terms and conditions of work], if the Board 
has not certified or the employer has not recognized a representative . . . under section 9”). 
This bill took care to allow “discussions” without imposing a formal duty to “bargain” on 
the organization or the employer. See id.; LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1704-06 (providing his-
tory of the bill). Indeed, the bill stated that section 8(a)(2) would still bar an employer from 
creating a formal organization with common characteristics of a labor union. See H.R. REP.
NO. 80-245, at 53, reprinted in HISTORY, supra, at 344. 
 136. Any attempt to deal with represented employees about terms and conditions of 
employment without going through the union violates the employer’s duty to bargain un-
der the NLRA and is considered unlawful “direct dealing.” See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (mak-
ing it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of [its] employees”); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 
(1944) (stating that it is unlawful under the NLRA for an “employer to disregard the bar-
gaining representative by negotiating with individual employees”); Toledo Typographical 
Union No. 63 v. NLRB (Toledo Blade), 907 F.2d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining 
that while “[a]n employer may deal directly with its employees . . . if it . . . obtains the con-
sent of their union,” it may not negotiate directly with an employee before bargaining with 
the union first); Estreicher, supra note 32, at 151-52. 
 137. The Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, H.R. 743, 104th Cong. 
(1996) (TEAM Act), would have lowered restrictions on employer-sponsored workplace par-
ticipation groups. Id. at § 3. The TEAM Act would have created a proviso to section 8(a)(2) 
stating that it is not unlawful 
for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organiza-
tion or entity of any kind, in which employees who participate to at least the 
same extent practicable as representatives of management participate, to ad-
dress matters of mutual interest, including, but not limited to, issues of qual-
ity, productivity, efficiency, and safety and health, and which does not have, 
claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining representatives of the 
employees or to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements with 
the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements between 
the employer and any labor organization, except . . . a case in which a labor or-
ganization is the representative of such employees as provided in section 9(a). 
Id. The House and Senate passed the TEAM Act, which President Clinton then vetoed. See
142 CONG. REC. H8816 (1996).
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posed modification ensures that non-section 9 work groups cannot 
take advantage of the protections that independent labor organiza-
tions enjoy under the NLRA.138 For example, the certification, recog-
nition, and contract bars—which preclude rival unions from seeking 
to represent workers for a period of time after an incumbent union 
becomes the employees’ representative139 or during much of the exis-
tence of a collective-bargaining agreement140—will not apply to these 
work groups. Thus, employers and employees would be able to en-
gage in information-sharing without fear of violating the NLRA.  
 Information-sharing would also be promoted by the clarity of the 
test—it would be unmistakable, ex ante, whether or not a group is a 
section 2(5) labor organization.141 Employers who want to establish a 
work group may do so without risk of a future section 8(a)(2) viola-
tion. Importantly, the modification favors neither traditional union-
ism nor employer-supported work groups; employees who want rep-
resentation by an independent union may still pursue that goal with-
 138. One could also exclude groups created by employers to thwart organizing cam-
paigns, see Estreicher, supra note 32, at 150-51; Summers, supra note 120, at 142 (arguing 
that a plan should not be allowed if an organizing campaign or representation proceeding 
was pending), or where an employer had recently committed an unfair labor practice, id.
(arguing for ban where unfair labor practice charge was pending or where unfair labor 
practice has been been committed within the last three years); Hyde, supra note 101, at 
190 (same). There have been many other alternatives proposed as well. See, e.g., Charles B. 
Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democ-
racy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 420, 430-31 (1992) (proposing no section 8(a)(2) violation unless 
an employer unilaterally establishes a group “for the purpose of chilling or precluding em-
ployee organizing”); Hyde, supra note 101, at 187-90 (arguing (1) that “labor organization” 
should be defined as any group that employees participate in and that “deals with” em-
ployers concerning any condition of work, (2) that “deals with” should be broadly defined 
and should include communicating or exercising delegated management authority, and (3) 
that an employer should be allowed to support a labor organization if approved by employ-
ees via a secret ballot for a specified time period); LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1708-09 (pro-
posing that section 8(a)(2) allow employers to create a group that discusses work conditions 
but does not claim or seek to be an exclusive bargaining representative); Summers, supra 
note 120, at 142-45 (proposing exceptions to section 8(a)(2) for plans that do not require an 
employer to bargain but that, among other things, allow employees to modify the plan’s 
structure, separate supervisors and nonsupervisors, and allow employee-elected represen-
tatives); Weiler, supra note 62, at 200 (arguing that section 8(a)(2) should ban only com-
pany-sponsored unions that collectively bargain, rather than merely deal, with the em-
ployer). 
 139. Under the certification bar, an incumbent union enjoys an irrebuttable presump-
tion of majority status for typically a year following certification; during that year, the 
Board will not order an election and the employer may not withdraw recognition, even if 
another union claims to have majority support. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-104 
(1954). Under the recognition bar, an incumbent union enjoys a irrebuttable presumption 
of majority status for a “reasonable period” after being recognized by the employer as the 
employees’ representative. E.g., Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 586-87 (1966). 
 140. Under the contract bar, an active collective bargaining agreement will inoculate 
the incumbent union from challenges to its majority status for a maximum of three years. 
See, e.g., Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962). 
 141. See Summers, supra note 120, at 141 (stressing the need for “reasonably clear” 
line between lawful and unlawful employee participation groups). 
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out interference by the employer.142 This heightens employee choice 
and encourages competition between unions and employers to fulfill 
employee demands. 
 Employer-supported work groups may also benefit from not being 
considered labor organizations. Avoiding that designation frees a 
group from the risk of liability for unfair labor practices under sec-
tion 8(b) of the NLRA143 and the reporting and disclosure require-
ments under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
(LMRDA) of 1959.144 Freedom from these laws could help spur the 
growth of work groups by allowing them to develop outside of federal 
labor restrictions.145 Similarly, in order to keep regulatory and em-
ployer costs low, there would be few, if any, legal requirements at-
tached to the structure of employer-supported work groups. For ex-
ample, although many employers would designate that employee 
representatives be freely elected, there would be no such require-
ment.146 Despite the lack of legal requirements, self-enforcing 
mechanisms would often advance employees’ interests, as work 
 142. See Weiler, supra note 62, at 178 (stating that key interests in labor law “are 
those of workers, rather than the unions who represent them or the companies who 
employ them”). 
 143. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2000) (establishing “labor organization” unfair labor prac-
tices, such as restraints on picketing). 
 144. See 29 U.S.C. § 431 (2000) (establishing LMRDA reporting and disclosure obliga-
tions); 29 U.S.C. § 439 (2000) (imposing fines or incarceration for failing to file required re-
ports under LMRDA); cf. Hyde, supra note 79, at 392-93 (reporting that saving money by 
avoiding the need to service collective bargaining agreements was one reason that the ex-
ecutive director of one group, ROC-NY, gave for ROC-NY organizing as a charity) (citing 
Interview with Saru Jayaraman, Executive Director, Restaurant Opportunities Ctr. of 
N.Y., in Newark, N.J. (Apr. 5, 2005)). Note that the LMRDA’s definition of labor organiza-
tion is broader than the NLRA’s definition. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 158(5) (2000) (NLRA defi-
nition), with 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (2000) (LMRDA definition). Section 402(i) defines “labor or-
ganization” as  
any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation commit-
tee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and 
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other 
terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general committee, 
joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate to a 
national or international labor organization, other than a State or local 
central body. 
§ 402(i). Such groups would also avoid—perhaps less defensibly—the requirement to ob-
serve democratic processes and a duty of fair representation to its members. See 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 411-415, 481-504 (2000) (LMRDA democratic requirements); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l 
v. O’Neil, 499 U.S. 65, 73-78 (1991) (discussing the duty of fair representation).
 145. See Hyde, supra note 79, at 392-94 (discussing group, ROC-NY, that obtained a 
contract on behalf of some New York City restaurant workers that was expressly not a col-
lective bargaining agreement). However, Hyde rightly questions whether ROC-NY would 
be able to avoid a finding that it was a labor organization if its status was ever challenged. 
Id. at 393 n.31. 
 146. Subsequent discussions of conditional deregulation and a change in the labor law 
default each include the requirement that work group representatives be freely elected. See
infra Parts IV.B-C. 
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groups without strong support from the workforce would have lit-
tle credibility or effectiveness. 
 Current law hinders the flexibility and originality that could 
serve to fill a much-needed niche for workers. By reducing the costs 
of creating nontraditional work groups, the proposal would allow 
more workers to fulfill their desire for some form of representation or 
voice at work. Moreover, because participation in these groups would 
generally be considered concerted and protected activity under the 
NLRA, employers could not retaliate against or interfere with such 
activity without violating the NLRA.147
 Concurrent with Congress’ amending of section 2(5) to encourage 
employer-supported nonunion work groups, however, it should also 
adopt other changes to the NLRA that strengthen the Board’s ability 
to remedy employer unfair labor practices or other inappropriate ob-
stacles to organizing. Employers are currently able to interfere with 
employees’ decision whether or not to pursue collective representa-
tion with little cost. The lack of a significant penalty for interfering 
with employees’ rights calls into question whether those rights have 
much value. Strengthening the Board’s enforcement powers while 
also relaxing the company union ban would give employers more 
freedom to establish work groups and, at the same time, provide bet-
ter protection of employees’ right to freely choose whether to partici-
pate in the employer-sponsored group rather than a more independ-
ent form of collective activity. 
 One reform particular to the company union prohibition is to 
change current holdings that refuse to consider a section 8(a)(2) un-
fair labor practice as a “continuing violation.”148 The result is that an 
employer can create and dominate a labor organization, sign a con-
tract “negotiated” with the organization, and—if not challenged 
within the NLRA’s six-month statute of limitations149—avoid any sec-
tion 8(a)(2) problems during the life of the contract.150 The harm cre-
ated by a contract negotiated with an employer-dominated labor or-
ganization should not be permitted to continue simply because, as is 
often the case, no one was prepared to file a section 8(a)(2) charge at 
 147. See infra note 206. 
 148. E.g., Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 419-23 (1960) (holding that 
section 10(b)’s six-month statute of limitations bars challenge to lawfulness of execution of 
collective-bargaining agreement and “continuing violation” theory is inapplicable if en-
forcement of agreement is not, by itself, unlawful); Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 816, 
824 n.19 (1980) (citing Local Lodge No. 1424, 362 U.S. 411), enforced, 728 F.2d 1254 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
 149. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000). 
 150. See Armored Transp., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 143, 145, 148 (2001), enforcement denied 
on other grounds sub nom. AT Sys. W., Inc. v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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the time the contract was signed.151 Although this is not a wide-
spread problem, such a change is consistent with the philosophy of 
the NLRA and the reforms proposed in this Article. 
 It is also important that employees’ right to choose independent 
union representation be adequately protected. In this vein, Samuel 
Estreicher has identified the need to proscribe work groups created 
in response to an organizing campaign, to strengthen protections 
against retaliatory discharges, to increase union access to employees, 
and to decrease the incentive to delay the representational process 
through litigation.152 Other changes could include permitting pri-
vate rights of action,153 increasing the use of injunctive relief,154
and accelerating elections.155
More generally, Congress needs to strengthen the Board’s limited 
remedial power.156 For instance, although employer-dominated 
“sham” unions are not widespread, the Board’s sole remedial power 
against even the most egregious section 8(a)(2) violations is to post 
notices and to disestablish such entities, neither of which is likely to 
dissuade employers committed to creating them.157 Giving the Board 
enhanced authority to punish employer unfair labor practices—
particularly through monetary fines—would impose real costs that 
 151. Generally, section 8(a)(2) charges are filed by independent unions that seek to 
represent a unit of employees only to find an employer-sponsored labor organization al-
ready in place. See id. at 148. 
 152. Estreicher, supra note 32, at 155. 
 153. Employers currently have the right, under section 303 of the LMRA, to sue in fed-
eral court for damages caused by union secondary boycotts. See 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (provid-
ing suit for damages caused by violation of section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(4) (2000)). Providing a private right of action would also enhance nonunion em-
ployees’ exercise of their right to pursue collective action. Few employees are aware that 
the NLRA applies in the nonunion setting, and the NLRB could do more to advertise that 
fact. Private actions, particularly if attorney’s fees and other damages were available, 
would drastically increase nonunion employees’ exercise of their NLRA rights, thereby 
maintaining the act’s relevance in an economy that is overwhelmingly nonunion. See Est-
lund, supra note 2, at 1554-58 (arguing that private right of action would provide more ef-
fective enforcement than currently exists under the NLRA). 
 154. Cf. Weiler, supra note 62, at 189-90, 205-06 (arguing for quicker enforcement of 
reinstatement orders through injunctive relief, expedited elections, and a ban on perma-
nent replacement of strikers). The Board General Counsel may seek injunctive relief 
against employer unfair labor practices pursuant to section 10(j), but must seek such relief 
against union secondary boycotts under section 10(l). See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), -(l) (2000).
 155. See Craver, supra note 138, at 420 (proposing maximum of two weeks between pe-
tition and election); Kaufman, supra note 122, at 800 (proposing four-week maximum). 
Other options, which are not endorsed here, include mandated employer neutrality and 
card-check recognition, as the proposed Employee Free Choice Act would require. See su-
pra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 156. Criticism of the Board’s limited remedial power has been widespread. See, e.g.,
Estlund, supra note 2, at 1536-40 (also citing other criticisms). 
 157. See Kaufman, supra note 122, at 747, 776-77 (describing management statements 
and NLRB enforcement statistics indicating some employers run work groups that they know 
may be unlawful because of weak penalties and low risk of a section 8(a)(2) violation). 
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an employer must take into account before attempting to interfere 
with employees’ rights under the NLRA.158
 The current company union prohibition harms both employers 
who want more input from their workers and employees who would 
like to provide such input but do not want traditional union repre-
sentation.159 By removing the threat of a section 8(a)(2) violation for 
employers that value employee input, whether as a benefit to the 
firm or as a means to attract workers,160 the proposed modification 
expands opportunities for worker voice and participation. It is diffi-
cult to see how the net effect of this expansion would be detrimen-
tal.161 Employees preferring an independent union could still pursue 
that path. Employees who want enhanced voice without a union or 
are employed at a firm where unionization is not a realistic possi-
bility would be better off if the NLRA’s company union restriction 
were modified to allow more development of employer-supported 
work groups.162
 As noted, it is unlikely that weakening the company union prohi-
bition would greatly damage traditional unionism.163 The proposal 
 158. Cf. Weiler, supra note 62, at 188 (noting that Board damage awards in even dis-
criminatory discharge cases are significantly limited and delayed). 
 159. As Clyde Summers has suggested, the current legal framework—particularly the 
extent to which it allows employers to fight unionization—is likely a significant factor in 
many employees’ stated preference for more voice, but not through a traditional union. See
Summers, supra note 120, at 138. Absent substantial employer hostility, employees may 
prefer traditional unions to a much larger degree. Id. The proposal here addresses part of 
this problem by pairing the modification of the company union prohibition with remedial 
changes that would increase enforcement and penalties for employer unfair labor practices. 
See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
 160. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 21, at 34 (describing survey result that em-
ployees typically welcome employer-initiated employee-involvement programs, although 
would prefer them to give employees more authority).
 161.  The lack of a significant cost to this change is in relation to the current state of 
unionism in the U.S. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1547, 1550-51. It is true, of course, that 
the modification proposed here would allow plans that do not necessarily represent a ma-
jority of workers and that could give employers more leeway to set up a sham organization 
that only pretends to take employee input into account. See Summers, supra note 120, at 
147. These possibilities, however, will often be discernable to employees—at least eventu-
ally—which undermines their threat. Moreover, employers seeking to infringe employees’ 
freedom to unionize currently have many other options, most of which are far more effec-
tive; thus, the possibility that an occasional employer will have another weapon in its ar-
senal is not a significant cost. Indeed, if penalties against employers increase, it is likely 
that this potential cost is vastly outweighed by the benefits of greater protection against 
employer interference. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text. 
 162. Indeed, prior to the enactment of the NLRA, some company unions were recog-
nized as providing benefits to employees through assistance with grievances; information 
gathering; communication with employers; and improving wages, benefits, and other con-
ditions of work. See Barenberg, supra note 77, at 849-51. Barenberg also notes that the 
benefits of company unions were often ultimately overshadowed by unmet employee de-
sires, and in the 1920s, most employers eventually discontinued their company unions; 
however, he recognizes that the earlier company unions were far less collaborative than 
modern work groups. See id. at 860-61, 875-79. 
 163. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. 
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may make organizing more difficult in some circumstances, but much 
of that difficulty would arise from workers being satisfied with the 
level of input they enjoy via their employer-sponsored work group. It 
is up to the union to convince employees that traditional unionism 
would be better. Thus, in addition to providing more employee voice, 
encouraging work groups would spur competition and innovation by 
traditional unions and give employees a taste of collective represen-
tation—possibly resulting in a higher level of union density.164 In-
deed, the company union prohibition under the Railway Labor Act165
(RLA) is narrower than the NLRB’s, yet union density is significantly 
higher in industries covered by the RLA.166 The goal, however, should 
not be purely to bolster traditional unionism. What is more impor-
tant is that competition and complementarity between union and 
nonunion vehicles of worker voice are likely to pull traditional un-
ions in a direction aimed more at value creation and less at rent 
appropriation. 
 Most workforces will remain nonunion in the current economic 
environment. The choice, then, is between the status quo or more 
nonunion workplaces with enhanced employee input. As evidenced by 
 164. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1544 (arguing that allowing employer work groups 
might spur innovation among unions); Rafael Gomez & Morley Gunderson, The Experience 
Good Model of Trade Union Membership, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS, supra note
77, at 92, 92, 102-08 (arguing that union membership is an “experience good”—a good or 
service “whose attributes and quality are hard to discern prior to purchase” or exposure); 
Hyde, supra note 101, at 160 (arguing that work groups might lead to unionization and 
may allow some form of union representation in workplaces where there is not majority 
support for the union); LeRoy, supra note 11, at 1702, 1710-11 (noting Canadian example 
of a work group transforming into a traditional union and a similar transformation in the 
U.S. at AT&T); Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal to 
Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 651, 681-88 (2006) (arguing that in-
creased competition among unions will result in increased union membership). 
 165. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2000). 
 166. The RLA states that representatives “shall be designated by the respective parties 
without interference, influence, or coercion by either party over the designation of repre-
sentatives by the other; and neither party shall in any way interfere with, influence, or co-
erce the other in its choice of representatives.” Id. § 152 (Third). Also, “it shall be unlawful 
for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to use the 
funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization, 
labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining.” Id. § 152 (Fourth). The RLA 
defines representative as “any person or persons, labor union, organization, or corporation 
designated either by a carrier or group of carriers or by its or their employees, to act for it 
or them.” Id. § 151 (Sixth). This suggests that the RLA’s company union prohibition, unlike 
section 8(a)(2), extends only to organizations that act in a representational role in collec-
tive bargaining activities. See Samuel Estreicher, Nonunion Employee Representation: A 
Legal/Policy Perspective, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 101, at 
196, app. 1 at 215. Although not attributable—at least not to any significant degree—to 
differences in the NLRA’s and RLA’s company union prohibitions, the union density in in-
dustries covered by the RLA is much higher than the current overall private sector rate of 
under 8%. For example, in 2006 the union density in the air transportation industry was 
49.3% and in the rail transportation industry union density was 70.9%. See Union Mem-
bership and Coverage Database, Union Membership, Coverage, Density and Employment 
by Industry (2006), http://unionstats.com (follow hyperlink listed under “Index of Tables”). 
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the Dunlop Commission report and subsequent literature, many em-
ployees say they want such input.167 The highly competitive envi-
ronment in which U.S. firms operate will provide both an incentive to 
develop welfare-enhancing innovations in workplace governance and 
a constraint on developments that transfer rents but do not add 
value. If welfare-enhancing innovations develop, adoption could be 
widespread; if not, there will be little change. Whatever the eventual 
effects, initial employer response is likely to be limited. Despite man-
agement protestations, the extent to which current law provides an 
overwhelming barrier to nonunion work groups is unclear,168 and 
their use may be limited to a significant degree by management re-
luctance to increase worker participation.169 Relaxation of the current 
restrictions would be a change in the right direction, however, en-
couraging and publicly sanctioning participation and cooperation in 
nonunion companies.170
B.   Changing the Labor Law Default 
 A particularly broad reform that could prompt far greater devel-
opment of nontraditional work groups than modifications to the com-
pany union ban would be to change the labor law default from its 
current nonunion setting. One alternative default would be a govern-
ance structure with some level of independent worker voice that does 
not rise to the level of formal collective bargaining—perhaps similar 
to Germany’s works councils.171 This default could be waived or re-
 167. See supra notes 62-66. 
 168. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. But see Kaufman, supra note 122, at 
753, 777-78 (describing interviews with managers who sought to avoid the cost and embar-
rassment of section 8(a)(2) litigation or to avoid giving a union grounds to file an unfair la-
bor practice charge). 
 169. It would take further change in employers’ view of the role of employees to signifi-
cantly increase the use of such groups. Employers in the U.S. are seeking more employee 
input then they did decades ago but have yet to completely buy into the idea of employees 
as true partners in the enterprise. See Summers, supra note 120, at 136 (noting that 
American employers have emulated Japan’s quality circles but have resisted allowing em-
ployee voice in more substantial decisions). That said, the use of such groups is growing, 
and fewer restrictions would likely further that trend. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 
21, at 172-73 (reporting survey results showing that many managers favor some employee 
involvement); Kaufman, supra note 122, at 753, 804-06 (noting growth in the U.S. and far 
greater use of such groups in Canada). 
 170. See Estlund, supra note 2, at 1548-49 (discussing effects of section 8(a)(2) on 
work groups). 
 171. Other commentators have discussed changing the default. See Barenberg, supra
note 77, at 959-61 (discussing making unionization the default); cf. WEILER, supra note 8, 
at 228-32 (discussing the hurdles to unionization caused by the current default); Estlund, 
supra note 2, at 1594-95 (discussing some difficulties resulting from the “non-union base-
line” rule that no union exists until a majority of employees organize); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 256-57 (2001) (noting that the 
nonunion “default rule represents a choice among a range of options” and that “any such 
rule has to be defended against reasonable alternatives”). 
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placed with the express approval of employees and management.172
As is the case for German works councils, one may want to require 
that the voice mechanism be activated only in those establish-
ments where it is requested by employees, while also exempting 
very small establishments.173
 At first blush, one might think that changing the default would 
have little effect. Labor law’s current nonunion default allows a ma-
jority of workers to either choose union representation or subse-
quently decertify a union.174 If union representation were the default, 
a majority of workers could similarly decertify the union as their 
agent or subsequently elect a union. This raises the question 
whether, in a frictionless system, employee preferences would be un-
affected by the initial default and thus lead to the same low level of 
private sector union coverage seen today. The answer is no. The labor 
law default has a significant effect on the resulting governance struc-
ture, even when a low cost procedure to move away from the default 
exists. Shifting to a union default, for example, would lead to wide-
spread union decertification but not to a steady-state private sector 
density as low as the current 7.4%.175
 The default’s importance results from several factors. One reason 
is that the NLRA certification and decertification process is far from 
frictionless.176 More important is that economic agents exhibit behav-
ioral inertia, often sticking with an existing rule or environment as 
long as it does not differ too much from the preferred choice.177 The 
default also acts as a signal that the state or employer has deemed 
the default as an appropriate norm.178 Further, as businesses engage 
in normal turnover, there is a tendency to move toward the default; 
currently, older businesses, including some that are unionized, are 
replaced by new businesses, which almost always begin as nonun-
ion.179 Many workplaces, therefore, will not change from the default 
governance structure. Yet, despite these factors, changing the default 
 172. Workable standards for determining whether an agreement to move from the de-
fault has been reached could include an election among workers or the type of unmistak-
able evidence required to find that a union has waived its right to bargain over a certain 
issue. See Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983) (holding that a valid 
waiver must be “ ‘explicitly stated’ ” and “clear and unmistakable” (quoting Mastro Plastics 
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283 (1956))).
 173. If the new labor law default is deemed by employers to be costly, one would see 
a spike in the number of small establishments holding employment to just below the 
coverage level. 
 174. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2000). 
 175. See supra note 16 (noting that in 2006, the union density was only 7.4%). 
 176. See Barenberg, supra note 77, at 933 (discussing costs of organizing and other 
types of collective action); WEILER, supra note 8, at 114-15. 
 177. See Sunstein, supra note 171, at 220-24. 
 178. See id. at 225-26. 
 179. See Barenberg, supra note 77, at 932-33. 
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rule will not act as a mandate. Rather, the default is a starting 
point—or bargaining “threat point”—from which the parties would 
remain free to move given mutual agreement.  
 We see virtue in a default that establishes some form of inde-
pendent work group, although not one with full collective bargaining 
rights. Workers would retain their current right to form independent 
unions without management approval. The default mechanism would 
specify standard procedures through which these independent work 
groups and management might discuss, negotiate, and approve mu-
tually beneficial changes. It is difficult to predict precisely how any 
given system might evolve and operate, and the default will not func-
tion well in all workplaces. We suspect that in many, if not most, 
workplaces, employees would not invoke their right to engage in col-
lective voice. In other workplaces, the employer and workers would 
have incentive to move away from the default and develop proposals 
for participatory welfare-enhancing governance structures, whether 
in the form of unions or less formal work groups. Over time, experi-
ence with such a system will lead to administrative and legislated 
changes in the default. 
 The inability to identify in advance all outcomes of a given reform 
is not a fatal flaw. The same can be said of any change, including the 
NLRA’s enactment in 1935. Moreover, laws and regulations evolve in 
response to changing benefits and costs. Adoption of a new workplace 
default would set off significant activity among management, work-
ers, and workers’ agents to communicate, negotiate, and arrive at al-
ternatives that make the parties better off. 
 Such a major change in labor law obviously requires thorough 
analysis and careful design. The actual working of such a system, 
however, would be determined in no small part by the way it 
evolves in the workplace, courts, and regulatory agencies. Given 
the current stagnation in the NLRA’s governance of the changing 
workplace, a fundamental change such as shifting the default 
could provide a useful catalyst for important modifications and re-
finements of labor regulation.180
 180. One concern in shifting the default toward collective voice is that such a change 
might transfer too much power to incumbent workers, leading to labor cost levels inconsis-
tent with full employment. It may prove difficult to limit the ability of work groups to ap-
propriate rents within a framework that promotes voice and the evolution of welfare-
enhancing arrangements. See Richard B. Freeman & Edward P. Lazear, An Economic 
Analysis of Works Councils, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND 
COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 27, 29, 49-50 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck 
eds., 1995).
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C.   Conditional Deregulation 
 Another means to encourage the development of certain types of 
work groups is a reform along the lines of David Levine’s proposed 
“conditional deregulation.”181 Under this proposal, a subset of gov-
ernmental regulations would be waived if there is consent by both 
the company and an approved worker organization within the com-
pany.182 Levine recognizes that there are a large number of govern-
mental mandates and regulatory measures regarding workplace 
safety, hours and overtime requirements, pensions, discrimination, 
family leave, and other subjects, but he argues that “one-size-fits-all” 
rules are often inefficient.183 Instead, he contends, employee involve-
ment in enforcing these rules could significantly lower the cost of 
workplace regulation.184 In the process of improving workplace regu-
lations, Levine’s proposal is likely to expand welfare-enhancing 
worker voice and participation.
 Under the Levine proposal, the default for nearly all firms would 
be the status quo—coverage by the full extent of regulations. These 
regulations would be divided into waivable and nonwaivable rules—
with the latter including a minimum set of standards, such as those 
dealing with discrimination or safety, required of all employers.185
Conditional deregulation would exempt employers from the waivable 
set of regulations and subject them only to the minimum standards if 
they voluntarily adopt alternative regulatory systems with em-
ployee oversight and approval.186 The expectation is that this form 
of conditional deregulation would be welfare-enhancing for both 
workers and employers. 
 In order to deregulate workplace standards, firms must have in 
place independent worker committees to perform the approval and 
oversight functions. The union and employer would provide such au-
thority within unionized companies.187 For larger nonunion employ-
ers, worker committees created via a certified free election process 
would have authority to approve the waiver on behalf of employ-
ees.188 Conditional deregulation would thus spur the establishment of 
worker associations throughout the private sector, providing a vehi-
cle for nonunion worker participation and cooperation. Such groups 
 181. David Levine, They Should Solve Their Own Problems: Reinventing Workplace 
Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 475, 477 
(Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997). 
 182. Id.
 183. Id. at 477-79. 
 184. Id. at 480. 
 185. Id. at 478, 483-84. 
 186. Id. at 483-84, 493. 
 187. Id. at 478. 
 188. See id. As Levine notes, this is similar to the experience in many European coun-
tries, where work councils often oversee workplace safety. Id.; see also supra notes 127-30. 
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might also be used as an instrument to transfer quasi-rents from 
shareholders to workers.189 But rent seeking should be limited given 
that employers can determine whether or not to stick with the de-
fault regulatory standard. Therefore, although the details of any such 
plan are important, conditional deregulation offers an opportunity to 
foster nonunion voice and provide mutual gains to workers and em-
ployers in at least some workplaces. In practice, it is possible that 
few establishments would opt out of the current regulatory regime. If 
nothing else, this would provide evidence that the costs of current 
regulations are not nearly so great as some critics allege. 
D.   State and Local Labor Regulation 
 A change in the national labor law default or conditional deregu-
lation requires strong public and legislative support, neither of which 
looks likely to occur imminently. Richard Freeman and others have 
suggested that a more promising source for labor regulation reform—
possibly including reforms that would encourage welfare-enhancing 
employee voice—is state legislation.190 The theory is that states’ suc-
cesses and failures in implementing workplace regulations would be 
imitated and avoided, respectively, by other states. Thus, to the ex-
tent that states have latitude to enact labor regulations, it is possible 
that state capitals may become the focal point for political action.191
Indeed, counties and municipalities already are often at the forefront 
of laws affecting the workplace, including sexual orientation antidis-
crimination measures and living wage ordinances.192
 Significant limits to the state and local model exist, however. The 
broad scope of NLRA preemption means that many major innova-
tions in labor regulation would be permissible only at the federal 
level.193 Accordingly, federal labor preemption must drastically 
 189. See supra note 40. 
 190. See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor Relations 
Law?, 58 PROCS. LAB. & EMP. REL. ASS’N ANN. MEETING 125 (2006) (arguing in favor of 
state regulation of labor relations). 
 191. See Minimum Wage Was ‘Hot Button’ Issue in State Labor Laws Enacted in 2005,
DAILY LABOR REP., Feb. 2, 2006, at A-1 (reporting that states enacted more labor and em-
ployment legislation in 2005 than usual). 
 192. See Indianapolis Adds Protections for Gays, Lesbians, DAILY LABOR REP., Jan. 6, 
2006, at A-11 (reporting that Marion County, Indiana, and the city of Indianapolis enacted 
legislation prohibiting workplace sexual orientation discrimination); Susan J. McGolrick, 
Professor Examines Living Wage Law Growth in Comments to New York Labor Law Fo-
rum, DAILY LABOR REP., May 26, 2004, at C-1 (stating that over 110 state and local living 
wage laws existed as of early 2004 and over seventy campaigns for such laws in other lo-
calities were taking place). 
 193. The federal preemption barrier is recognized by Freeman. See Freeman, supra 
note 190; see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959) 
(holding that NLRA generally preempts state action involving (1) conduct that NLRA 
clearly protects or prohibits or (2) conduct that NLRA arguably protects or prohibits where 
there is danger to national labor policy in allowing state, rather than NLRB, to examine is-
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change for any significant state or local innovations in workplace 
governance to occur. Because labor preemption is primarily a crea-
tion of the Supreme Court—based on its interpretation of congres-
sional intent—such a modification is theoretically possible without 
legislation.194 Yet, the Court’s preemption jurisprudence began in 
earnest almost fifty years ago and is unlikely to suddenly shift absent 
legislative action. 
 The cost of federal preemption is that it forecloses what might 
otherwise be beneficial state labor and employment law innovations. 
Were federal preemption relaxed, governance innovations adopted in 
large states would frequently lead national firms to implement them 
company-wide. Moreover, if innovations in states of any size were 
viewed as welfare-enhancing, other states would be more likely to 
copy them; governance innovations that are costly to firms or appear 
to provide few benefits to workers are least likely to be adopted.195
Some variation in state employment regulation should also be wel-
fare-enhancing by allowing legal heterogeneity that reflects differ-
ences in the preferences of voters, in states’ economic environments, 
and in the legitimate influence of interest groups. 
 Federal labor preemption, however, provides the obvious benefit 
of enabling employers with establishments in more than one state to 
operate under the same legal regime.196 Variations in state regula-
tions may produce other negative effects as well. For example, politi-
cians in some states may be overly sensitive to business interests and 
the location of new plants, thereby adopting labor and employment 
laws that may not be welfare-enhancing.197 Politicians in other states 
may produce a set of labor and employment laws that are overly 
sue); Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment Rela-
tions Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140-51 (1976) (upholding dormant preemption that precludes 
state regulation where NLRA intends parties to freely engage in economic conflict); Est-
lund, supra note 2, 1569-79 (describing preemption and arguing for allowing more state 
and local labor regulation). Interestingly, unions often face a much greater risk of entan-
glement with state law, as the preemption doctrine has increasingly allowed state liability 
for union conduct that is alleged to have violated state tort law. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Tak-
ing State Property Rights out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L. REV. 891, 935-40 (2006); 
Getman, supra note 124, at 132 (citing libel, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and strike violence as claims against a union which could be dealt with under 
state law).
 194. See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 155; Garmon, 359 U.S. at 240. 
 195. For example, several states require employer-sponsored safety committees, which 
in at least one state appears to have significantly lowered the cost of workplace injuries. 
See Levine, supra note 181, at 481. 
 196. See, e.g., Erik Schelzig, FedEx’s Smith Warns of Regulating, MEMPHIS 
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Aug. 16, 2006, at C2 (quoting FedEx chairman’s warning to the na-
tional conference of state legislatures that additional state regulation can drive business 
away because “commerce today is not local in virtually any respect”). 
 197. This is a variant of the argument that states will engage in a “race to the bottom.” 
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beneficial to incumbent workers, which may discourage new plants 
and job growth. 
 In the end, the attractiveness of greater state and local flexibility 
depends on numerous factors that are difficult to assess. Heterogene-
ity in states’ and localities’ underlying preferences and economic en-
vironments makes heterogeneity in the law more attractive. Lack of 
uniformity in the law has a cost, however, particularly in a dynamic 
economy with considerable interstate (and international) commerce. 
Legal experimentation and innovation can provide many of the same 
benefits as does competition in the private economy. But the link is 
not nearly so clear-cut. Many reasonable persons will prefer to put all 
their eggs in a single basket of federal labor regulation than in the 
many baskets of various state labor laws. A more nuanced analysis, 
one beyond the scope of this Article, would identify the specific forms 
of labor and employment regulation that might best operate at the 
federal level and those for which state and local heterogeneity would 
be most beneficial.
 Regardless of one’s view of the attractiveness of state and local 
innovation in workplace governance, a move in that direction faces 
considerable political, legal, and economic barriers.198 Accordingly, we 
believe that greater state and local labor regulation may expand 
welfare-enhancing worker voice and participation in certain geo-
graphic areas, but is not a particularly promising avenue for the 
country as a whole.199
E.   The Internet 
 The promotion of employee voice and participation also requires 
labor regulations that ensure employees’ freedom to use electronic 
communications to converse with each other about workplace con-
cerns. E-mail, weblogs, and websites, which we refer to simply as the 
“Internet,” have sharply lowered communication costs and are chang-
ing the way in which people interact. This change is highly signifi-
cant for the workplace, as the Internet has become a vital tool for a 
wide variety of entities such as unions, companies, employees, work 
groups, and policy advocates. Employees’ use of the Internet at 
work—from communications made while at the worksite to work 
done exclusively as a telecommuter—has continued to grow drasti-
cally. In the October 2003 supplement to the Current Population 
Survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimated that 55.5% of 
all employees used a computer at work and that 41.7% used the 
 198. To varying degrees, the same might be said for other reforms analyzed in this Article. 
 199. The appeal of state labor reform to Freeman and other scholars may stem less 
from their optimism about the promise of state reforms than from pessimism regarding the 
possibility or direction of federal reforms.  
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Internet, although computer use varies substantially with respect to 
occupation, industry, and education.200 The Board, even as early as 
1993, recognized that at some worksites, e-mail had “become an im-
portant, if not essential, means of communication.”201 That descrip-
tion is far more apt today. 
 The low cost of electronic communications has made it particu-
larly valuable to unions and other groups attempting to organize em-
ployees, as they provide an affordable means to reach many employ-
ees, especially at small and widely dispersed job sites.202 However, 
given the low rate of private sector unionism, most employees’ use of 
the Internet for collective action takes place in firms that are nonun-
ion. The Internet provides nonunion firms interested in promoting 
employee voice and cooperation an additional, low-cost means of 
communicating with their employees. Use of the Internet is not with-
out legal risk, however. Although to a far lesser extent than Internet 
usage by outside organizers or work groups,203 employees’ freedom to 
use electronic communications to discuss work issues among them-
selves or with their employer faces possible hurdles under the NLRA. 
 A threshold issue involving employee Internet use is the extent to 
which electronic communications are treated as concerted activity 
 200. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, COMPUTER AND 
INTERNET USE AT WORK IN 2003 2 tbl.A (2005), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ciuaw.pdf; see also Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy Mans-
field, On the Increasing Presence of Remote Employees: An Analysis of the Internet’s Impact 
on Employment Law as It Relates to Teleworkers, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 233, 234-
35 (discussing rise in teleworkers). E-mail is not the only popular form of electronic com-
munication for employees; one survey found that 35% of employees used instant messaging 
at work. See Survey Finds More Employer Policies Focus on Employees’ Email than IM, 
Blogs, DAILY LABOR REP., July 18, 2006, at A-8.
 201. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 919 (1993). 
 202. See U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 17 (2006) (describing employee orga-
nizing drive started by downloading information from union website and distributing it to 
other employees); Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 8, 10-11 (2005) 
(finding that employer unlawfully terminated employee who, among other union activities, 
created a Yahoo! webpage to encourage discussions among employees during organizing 
campaign), enforced, 181 F. App’x 85 (2d Cir. 2006); Freeman, supra note 79, at 2, 10-11 
(noting that “all international federations and thousands of local unions [have] developed 
websites” and describing AFL-CIO’s “Working Families Network,” which has over two mil-
lion e-mail addresses of union “eActivists”). 
 203. Nonemployee organizers’ ability to use an employers’ Internet system raises sev-
eral important issues that are beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on maximiz-
ing employee voice and workplace cooperation in an economy where the dominant form of 
workplace governance is based on nonunion, managerial discretion. These issues include 
whether organizers’ unauthorized use of an employer’s electronic communications system 
is treated the same as organizers’ unauthorized activity on an employer’s real property. 
See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1992) (holding that employer can ex-
clude organizers from its property in a nondiscriminatory manner if reasonable alterna-
tives to contacting employees exist); Hirsch, supra note 193, 899-905, 916-43 (discussing 
Lechmere and proposing new Board analysis for nonemployee right to access cases). 
1174 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1133 
                                                                                                                   
that is protected by the NLRA.204 The question is important given 
that, in many workplaces, a significant amount of employee interac-
tions occur electronically.205 Even where these interactions involve 
discussions and cooperation with an employer, employees must have 
the freedom to talk among themselves without fear of employer inter-
ference. Indeed, whatever value may inure to the employer or em-
ployees from enhanced employee voice is dependent on a free flow of 
information. If employees fear that their comments, suggestions, or 
requests will result in adverse employment actions, they are unlikely 
to participate in meaningful workplace communications. Having an 
independent third party—the NLRB—guarantee and protect employ-
ees’ right to communicate without undue employer interference could 
be an important safeguard that helps to foster workplace participation. 
 The potential for employers to react negatively to employee com-
ments is not far-fetched. Lower-level supervisors and managers, in 
particular, may be more concerned with their personal interests than 
that of the firm as a whole.206 Yet, the performance of these supervi-
sors and managers is likely to be an important piece of information 
that employees possess and employers want.207 It is exactly this type 
of knowledge that can provide significant benefits for workplace co-
operation programs—but only if employees believe that they can pro-
vide the information without suffering adverse actions. The NLRA is 
well-suited to safeguard employees in such situations.208
 Section 7 of the NLRA protects most employee activity that is 
concerted—that is, activity that seeks to promote or protect employ-
ees’ collective workplace interests.209 Thus, an employer generally 
 204. See Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248-50 (1997) (concluding that em-
ployee’s e-mail criticism of vacation benefits was protected under the Act); E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours, 311 N.L.R.B. at 897 (finding that employer unlawfully barred union literature 
from company e-mail system); Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National La-
bor Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1, 49-50 (2000) (discussing the Timekeeping and E.I. du Pont de Nemours cases). 
 205. See supra note 200; Elena N. Broder, Note, (Net)workers’ Rights: The NLRA and 
Employee Electronic Communications, 105 Yale L.J. 1639, 1657 (1996). 
 206. See Hirsch, supra note 49, at 984-85 & n.186 (noting managerial interests, such as 
salary and job security, that may create a disparity between managers’ interests and the 
firm’s interests). 
 207. See id. at 971-73 (discussing possibility that employees’ increased participation in 
employee stock ownership plans may lead to better monitoring of work). 
 208. One private source for this safeguarding role is the Anonymous Employee 
website, which provides a means for employees who fear retaliation to inform, and 
possibly engage in a dialogue with, their employer about workplace problems while 
maintaining their anonymity. See Anonymous Employee, How Does It Work?, 
http://www.anonymousemployee.com/csssite/sidelinks/how.php (last visited Nov. 29, 2007). 
 209. Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to “self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). Those rights are en-
forced through section 8(a)(1), which provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for 
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may not engage in any activity that reasonably tends to make em-
ployees feel that their right to engage in concerted activity is chilled. 
Typically, Internet usage is considered the same as any other tradi-
tional, concerted and protected communication.210 This approach 
makes sense, for the means of communication has little or no effect 
on whether an activity is considered concerted and protected under 
section 7. The Internet merely serves as a resource to engage in this 
type of activity, and the Board appropriately treats it as such.211
 Because a section 8(a)(1) violation requires only a “reasonable 
tendency” to interfere with employees’ freedom to engage in protected 
activity, no matter the motive,212 employers must ensure that they do 
not retaliate, even unintentionally, against employees’ electronic 
communications. An employer that encourages employee participa-
tion should make clear to employees that they are generally free to 
communicate with each other and with the employer without facing 
negative consequences. Punishing an employee for even a highly 
critical e-mail would not only chill employees’ willingness to fully 
an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [their sec-
tion 7] rights.” Id. § 158(a)(1). An employer violates section 8(a)(1) even when its “conduct 
tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in” the exercise of their section 7 
rights; evidence of animus or actual coercion is unnecessary. See Retlaw Broad. Co. v. 
NLRB, 53 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). Moreover, section 7 protects 
collective activity even where no formal organization is involved. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. 
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-16 (1962) (holding that employees involved in walkout were 
protected even though not part of organized group).
 210. See, e.g., Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247-48 (1997) (finding that 
employee’s e-mail to other employees was concerted and protected activity that was “for 
the ‘purpose of [. . .] mutual aid or protection’ ” because the e-mail criticized the employer’s 
proposed vacation policy and implicitly attempted to elicit support from others employees 
to oppose the proposal (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157)). A further problem that may result from 
increased use of electronic communications involves employees who do not work at the 
primary worksite, such as telecommuters. Under the Board’s long-standing test for deter-
mining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, the Board consid-
ers factors including the hiring party’s right to control the work, the location of the work, 
and “ ‘the hiring party’s discretion over when and how to work.’ ” St. Joseph News-Press, 
345 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 7 (2005) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 
730, 750-52 (1989)). Unless the Board adapts its test to reflect technological changes that 
make telecommuting more common and employers better able to maintain control over 
telecommuters, those workers are more likely to be considered independent contractors 
and excluded from the protection of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (exempting 
independent contractors from NLRA definition of employee). Without the protection of the 
NLRA, telecommuters will be less likely to participate in a workplace cooperative program 
if they fear the possibility that their employer will retaliate against their contributions to 
the program.
 211. A problem, however, is that many nonunion employees may not realize that their 
concerted activity is protected by the NLRA. Hyde, supra note 76, at 507 (noting that non-
union employee activity often fails to garner the respect and protection of unionized con-
duct, perhaps in part because nonunion action does not fit the stereotype of NLRA-
protected conduct).  
 212. See Retlaw Broad., 53 F.3d at 1006. 
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participate in workplace discussions but likely violate section 8(a)(1) 
as well.213
 Yet employees must also be wary. Complications exist when, as is 
common, employees use employer-provided Internet services.214 An 
employer’s interests in the operation of its Internet system may alter 
the typical section 7 balancing test between employee rights and em-
ployer interests, and that shift may be dispositive in determining 
whether employee activity on an employer’s system is protected.215
Under this balancing test, an employee’s concerted and otherwise 
protected action will lose section 7 protection if it unreasonably inter-
feres with the employer’s business interests. For example, in Wash-
ington Adventist Hospital, Inc.,216 the Board found that a nonunion 
employee’s e-mail critical of its employer was not protected by the 
NLRA because it automatically appeared on all computers and re-
quired a user to delete the message to remove it from the screen.217
According to the Board, this e-mail interrupted employees’ work dur-
ing a busy time and took over the system as medical information was 
being entered.218 Although a similar message that lacked such an ef-
fect would generally be protected,219 the Board will likely continue to 
 213. See Timekeeping, 323 N.L.R.B. at 247-48. 
214. See generally Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the 
NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming February 2008), manuscript available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=957606. 
 215. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 
(1965) (holding that “it is only when the interference with [section] 7 rights outweighs the 
business justification for the employer’s action that [section] 8(a)(1) is violated”). Given this 
Article’s focus on employer-initiated workplace cooperation schemes, we do not address 
problems involving employer attempts to broadly restrict employees’ use of the Internet or 
e-mail, which implicates the Republic Aviation line of cases. Republic Aviation Corp. v. 
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 n.8 (1945) (citing Le Tourneau Co. of Ga, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1259-
60 (1944) (holding that, with some exceptions, employers cannot prohibit discussions 
among employees about concerted and protected topics during non-work time)); see, e.g., In 
re Guard Pub. Co. (Register-Guard), Nos. 36-CA-8743-1 et al., 2002 WL 336963 (N.L.R.B. 
Div. Judges Feb. 21, 2002) (finding by ALJ that the employer could lawfully maintain a 
nondiscriminatory rule banning all non-work-related solicitations, including messages 
about unionization, from its Internet system); Press Release, NLRB, NLRB to Hold Oral 
Argument on Employee Use of Employer’s E-Mail System (Jan. 10, 2007) (noting that 
the full, five-member Board will consider the case), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Press%20Releases/2006/R-2613.pdf; see also Adrantz, 
ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A., Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 291, 293 (2000) (finding that em-
ployer’s broad ban against all non-work e-mails was not an unfair labor practice because 
the rule was not regularly enforced against personal e-mails and there was no evidence of 
it being discriminately applied to prohibit union discussions via e-mail), vacated in part on 
other grounds, 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Instead, where an employer authorizes 
some employee use of its electronic communication system, the greater threat is re-
taliation against specific messages and the chilling effect of surveillance and monitor-
ing of those communications.
 216. 291 N.L.R.B. 95 (1988) (finding that employer did not unlawfully fire employee). 
 217. Id. at 98, 103. 
 218. Id. at 103. 
 219. See, e.g., Timekeeping, 323 N.L.R.B. at 249 (expressly distinguishing Washington 
Adventist and finding that use of employer’s e-mail system to send messages criticizing 
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find that e-mails causing disruptions to the extent of what occurred 
in Washington Adventist are excessive. The result is that employees 
must be careful in how they use their employer’s Internet system. 
 Another issue centers on whether employer’s surveillance of em-
ployees’ electronic communications—or the creation of an impression 
of such surveillance—may unlawfully chill employees’ ability to en-
gage in meaningful discussions with one another about workplace is-
sues. In particular, the monitoring of employees’ Internet use, which 
many employers now do as a routine matter,220 may constitute 
unlawful surveillance if some of those communications involve sub-
jects related to protected activity.221 Employees participating in an 
employer-sponsored work group are susceptible to this risk, as they 
are likely to be in contact with other employees to discuss their views 
on workplace matters. If the employer monitors e-mails, a reasonable 
employee is likely to feel hesitant about criticizing her employer or 
supervisor. That chilling effect could undermine the value of work-
place participation programs and violate the NLRA. 
 The Board’s well-established surveillance law seeks to minimize 
the chilling effect on protected conduct by reducing the risk that em-
ployees believe that their employer is taking special efforts to moni-
tor their collective activity.222 Thus, absent sufficient justification, an 
employer violates the NLRA by observing employees engaged in 
protected activity or making an impression that they are engaging 
employer’s vacation policy proposal was protected activity); Malin & Perritt, supra note
204, at 57 (arguing that employer should have to prove an actual, significant disruption be-
fore barring employee e-mail solicitations). 
 220. One 2005 survey found that 76% of employers monitored the Internet use of at 
least some of its employees. See Study Finds 76 Percent of Respondents Monitor Usage of 
Internet by Employees, DAILY LABOR REP., May 25, 2005, at A-8 (finding also that 62% of 
employers monitor Internet use of all of their employees).
 221. Moreover, attempts to use an employer-controlled system without authorization 
risks violating the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). See 18 U.S.C. 
§2701 (2000). In the ECPA, Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act, which 
makes it a crime to “intentionally access[ ] without authorization a facility through which 
an electronic communication service is provided . . . and thereby obtain[ ] . . . access to a 
wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.” Id. §
2701(a); see also id. § 2701(c)(2) (exempting conduct authorized by user of service); Konop 
v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879-80 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing the district 
court’s grant for summary judgment because employer’s access to employee’s restricted-
access site may violate Stored Communications Act). The ECPA, however, contains an ex-
ception in certain instances for employer monitoring of workplace communications. See, 
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (monitoring employer’s own service); Malin & Perritt, supra 
note 204, at 38-40 (citing exceptions). 
 222. See Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (holding that photographing or videotaping protected activity has tendency to in-
timidate employees); Belcher Towing Co. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 705, 708 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that, although surveillance is not per se unlawful, it has “natural, if not presump-
tive, tendency to discourage [union] activity”). 
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in such observations.223 Sufficient justification for surveillance ex-
ists where an employer can show the existence of a reasonable 
threat of violence or other misconduct that would affect the em-
ployer’s business.224
 The key issue regarding an employer’s monitoring of electronic 
communications is whether a sufficient business justification exists. 
This inquiry should depend on whether the employer’s monitoring 
resembles a program that (1) merely screens electronic communica-
tions for certain words or other indications of improper usage (for ex-
ample, pornography) or (2) regularly reports the content of communi-
cations or the identities of employees using the Internet. Both cir-
cumstances could reasonably lead employees to believe that the em-
ployer is monitoring their protected discussions. The latter example, 
however, has a far weaker business justification, thereby failing to 
defend the employer’s surveillance and increasing the interference 
with employees’ ability to communicate with each other without fear 
of retaliation. In short, an employer should have few problems if it 
does not attempt to monitor specific communications related to pro-
tected activity and does not generally monitor the substance of Inter-
net activity. Employers, however, must be careful not to make their 
observations too broad or specific. 
 Regardless of the NLRB’s approach to the issues of protection and 
surveillance of electronic communications, the Internet will continue 
to play a large role in the workplace. The NLRA, however, will have 
an impact on the Internet’s ability to foster collective action. That 
impact will be most significant with regard to outside groups’ ability 
 223. See Snyder’s of Hanover, Inc. v. NLRB, 39 F. App’x 730, 736-37 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(watching employees take handbills); U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 98, 101-02 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (rejecting the proposition that surveillance alone constitutes a presumptive vio-
lation of the NLRA); Ingram Book Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 515, 518 (1994) (finding unlawful sur-
veillance of union meeting because company vice president did not state credible reason for 
driving past meeting spot twice and employer was hostile toward union activities). An im-
pression of surveillance violation occurs where, “under all the relevant circumstances, rea-
sonable employees would assume from [the employer’s action or statement] that their un-
ion or other protected activities had been placed under surveillance.” Frontier Tel. of Roch-
ester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 8, 9 (2005) (citing Flexsteel Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 257 
(1993); Schrementi Bros., Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 853 (1969)), enforced, 181 Fed. App’x 85 (2d 
Cir. 2006). An impression of surveillance finding does not require that employees at-
tempted to keep their activity secret or that the employer used unlawful means to obtain 
knowledge of the employees’ activity. Id. at 9 n.19 (citing United Charter Serv., Inc., 306 
N.L.R.B. 150, 151 (1992)). 
 224. See Nat’l Steel, 156 F.3d at 1271 (holding that “reasonable, objective justifica-
tion”—such as legitimate security interests, gathering evidence for legal proceeding, or 
reasonable anticipation of misconduct—will mitigate tendency to coerce). Explaining to 
employees why the surveillance is necessary will be an important part of this justification. 
Cf. Teletech Holdings, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 402, 403-04 (2001) (concluding that employer 
must clarify for employees a facially overbroad no-distribution rule to rebut presump-
tion of unlawfulness). 
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to contact workers in the face of employer resistance,225 but the 
NLRA does have some relevance to employer-sponsored worker par-
ticipation programs. To be sure, employers that are willing to en-
courage worker voice are less likely to interfere with employees’ free-
dom to exercise that voice. Nevertheless, the NLRA can protect em-
ployees’ freedom to use electronic communications while participat-
ing in employer-sponsored cooperation programs. This protection will 
encourage employee voice and cooperation that is more honest and 
representative of other employees’ interest, which will in turn make 
workplace participation programs more useful. 
V.   CONCLUSION
 Over the past seventy years, the NLRA has played an important 
role in the development of private sector unionization. The NLRA’s 
current role has become marginalized, however, largely failing to ef-
fectively serve either the small private union sector or the large non-
union sector. This failure is most pronounced with regard to the de-
mand for, and potential gains from, greater workplace voice and co-
operation in many nonunion workplaces. To the extent that mutual 
employer and worker gains are to be realized, they will occur largely 
through nonmandated employer workplace norms in nonunion estab-
lishments. Accordingly, the NLRA should foster the development of 
employee voice in the nonunion sector; however, the statute more 
frequently acts as a hurdle than a spur to welfare-enhancing work-
place communications and cooperation. 
 We have suggested labor and employment law reforms that might 
facilitate the development of greater voice and cooperation in the 
nonunion private sector while providing the impetus for unions to 
create joint value and flourish in an increasingly competitive world. 
Specifically, we suggest weakening the NLRA’s company union pro-
hibition in a manner that would permit more employer-supported 
work groups, as they will often serve as the best option for employee 
voice in the largely nonunion private sector. Other possible reforms 
include changing the nonunion labor law default, allowing for condi-
tional deregulation that encourages the development of independent 
workers councils as a substitute for governmental mandates, and 
greater experimentation and competition in state and local labor 
regulations. Finally, labor law should recognize the lower costs of 
communication and coordination associated with the Internet, en-
couraging its use to enhance workplace voice and participation. 
 The most likely prospect for the near future is the absence of sig-
nificant policy innovations. With or without major changes, however, 
 225. See supra note 203. 
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evolutionary transformation in the workplace will continue as eco-
nomic agents react to changing opportunities and constraints. Rather 
than relying on a labor law regime designed for a different era or in-
creasing the use of federal one-size-fits-all labor regulations, a better 
way exists. Employment and labor law reforms that encourage and 
facilitate the evolution and development of nonunion workplace voice 
and cooperation can best satisfy the diverse needs of workers, em-
ployers, and society in the modern economy. 
